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JANUARY, 1925

VATICAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(Paper read on December 9th, 1924.)

IT is not easy to think of any subject of contemporary political interest which it would be more difficult to handle without offence in the presence of a mixed assembly, than that of the policy of the Vatican in the twentieth century. An element of ancient prejudice (dating, it may be, from the Gunpowder Plot, and early implanted in our patriotic souls by the annual happy despatch of its principal conspirator) threatens in this connection to combine with a feeling of sometimes passionate reproach towards all who during the War failed to place their full resources, whether moral or material, at the unfettered disposal of the Entente Powers, and thus to impair that power of calm—I do not say cold—consideration to which the true student of ideas and events is deeply pledged. And a Catholic labours under this further disadvantage, that his conclusions upon secular issues in which the Church is involved sometimes go suspected in the belief that he has long since surrendered at the instance of his ecclesiastical superiors the native obligation of thoughtful and disinterested judgment upon matters within the competence of the individual human mind. These sort of suspicions, tending as they do to deprive one party of the faith which they desire to feel in the single-heartedness of the speaker, and the other of that good-will and indulgence in his audience without which he can scarcely hope to render them anything but a limited and impoverished service, are best reckoned with at the outset. They will not seem too formidable to those who believe that in all research and in all

debate Sweetness is the precursor of Light, and that Sympathy and even Sentiment, if held in check with curb and harness, may also serve to draw the chariot of Truth.

All roads, they tell us, lead to Rome; and yet Rome remains at a great remove from the understanding of Great Britain. A question about anything Catholic inserted in a general knowledge paper would be sure not to fail of its reward. "Will you endure to see a chasuble set up in your market-place?" Mr. Buchan supposes one of his characters to say to a gathering of his fellow-countrymen. "Will you have your daughters sold into simony? Will you have celibacy practised in the public streets?"¹ And, if we cannot lay claim to be compatriot with that celebrated woman with the West in her voice who, on being admitted to a Papal audience, advanced to the encounter with the salutation "How do, Pope! Knew your father the late Pope!" our property in the excellent female who inquired of a monk, lately promoted to the Sacred College, whether it was not the fact that in cases like his the Pope was in the habit of releasing a religious from his vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, will not perhaps be called into dispute. For such happy natures as these the Vatican furnishes an inexhaustible mine of romance, an Arabian Nights Entertainment more lively than any to be found in Bagdad or Bokhara. They perceive in the Curia the direct offspring of the Scarlet Woman and they are easily satisfied that no Pope, who has not learnt to circumvent the poison plots of his cook by living upon eggs, will ever dare to be a reformer.

It is tempting to pursue these pleasant paths of fiction, for Clio has a duller tale to tell. But learned societies have their obligations, and the British Empire contains some fourteen million Catholics to whose faith, feeling and ideals it is increasingly important that their fellow-countrymen should pay some slight attention.

The death of Leo XIII occurred in 1903. The close of his long reign coincided nearly with the advent of another century; and the sense of a new age—of an age intent upon change and indifferent to experience—was immediately in the air. Even within the walls of the Conclave Past and Present met in uneasy conflict. Cardinal Rampolla, the out-going Secretary of State, was by virtue of his high character and long administration an obvious candidate for the papal throne. He would not, as competent authorities believe, have been elected; but even the possibility of such an issue was sufficient to cause anxiety to the House

¹ *The Three Hostages.*

of Austria, whose policy ran counter to his own. Cardinal Puzyna, as a subject of the Dual Monarchy, was therefore instructed to assert, if circumstances required, the ancient right of veto enjoyed by the Habsburgs in the event of the election of a Pope displeasing to them. Nervous and evidently ill-informed, the Cardinal disclosed his mandate to prevent the choice of Rampolla before there was any need to do so. The Austrian right of veto could not be denied, but the exercise of it was deeply resented; for it seemed to the men of the new century that the freedom of the Sacred College should go entirely unfettered. Though Rampolla's candidature was thus defeated, measures were immediately taken to avert any repetition of the offence. One of the first acts of Cardinal Sarto, who ascended the Papal Throne with the style of Pius X, was to sweep away the ancient privilege of the Habsburg Emperors.¹

The character of the new Pope was strikingly beautiful. A Venetian of modest origin, he had early attracted the attention of his superiors by his piety, his understanding and his pastoral excellence. Men found him at once singularly lovable and surprisingly firm. A little trick that he had of clenching his hand, when any considerable matter was in issue, discovered to those who knew him best a conscience void of opportunism and an unbending rectitude of purpose. Prayer was not with him confined to the sphere of private needs; he brought his public actions within its scope; and he is said to have passed the night that preceded the rupture of the Concordat with France on his knees before the tomb of the Apostle. His intimates recognised in him a man of exceptional holiness; it is not improbable that the Church will presently canonise him as a saint. "Ce fut," says M. Carrère in a book that has been very widely read, "sans doute de tous les papes qui sont passés sur le trône de Pierre celui qui par son courage, sa bonté robuste et les coups d'aile de son âme, s'est rapproché le plus du pêcheur de Galilée."²

Such a character, though its possessor could scarcely rise, under the conditions of modern democracy, to the highest places in the State, has always had an uncontested value in the counsels and government of the Church; and there is no more instructive commentary upon much that is still believed about the craft of Papal diplomacy than the accession of this courageous, holy priest whom

¹ The privilege was not peculiar to Austria, but was claimed also by the Sovereigns of France and Spain. It does not appear to have rested upon any definite grant or other sure foundation.

² L. Carrère, *Le Pape*, p. 194.

people were accustomed, though, so far as academic distinction was concerned, quite erroneously, to think of as a *bon curé de campagne*, to a position of supreme power in the direction of Vatican policy.

In tears and distress the new Pope took up the burden of his office—that care of churches spread over a wider world than any the Apostle of the Gentiles had dreamed of, and of a Christendom rent by differences moral and spiritual and soon to resort to war. But the burden was immediately shouldered with a determination that was everywhere felt and an independence of mind of which the selection of the new Cardinal-Secretary was no slight proof. Mgr. Merry del Val was at that time a young and ardent churchman whose cosmopolitan origin,¹ knowledge of languages, clarity of purpose and diplomatic ability combined together to bring him into notice. An English seminary education and a great distinction of manner and bearing which makes of his celebration of Mass at St. Peter's, if such things can properly be thus regarded, one of the lesser sights of Rome, give to his native talents a singular stamp and setting; and even still, though his non-Italian descent renders it unlikely that he will ever occupy St. Peter's Chair, his personality remains perhaps the most striking and the most discussed in Vatican circles. Gossip, which plays picturesquely about the Curia and will have it to be divided into the parties of the Zelanti and Politici, represents him as the leading spirit among the Zealots and the enemy of all such as would compromise with Modernism in Church or State. We may, perhaps, respectfully infer that he has been a faithful steward of the things committed to his charge.

Pius X is said to have discovered the rare qualities of Cardinal Merry del Val only during the course of the Conclave which raised him to the Papacy. If it was so, the choice of the new Cardinal-Secretary was the more remarkable. No two Churchmen could have seemed less alike in disposition—the one all marked with a noble simplicity; the other penetrating, versatile and accomplished. Yet the historian will find no flaw in their co-operation. The Pope had known his man; the Cardinal came to venerate his master. The great heart of the one and the fine intellect of the other worked together with a common purpose; and that purpose was profoundly good. It might have been said of them without inaccuracy that there were diversities of gifts but one spirit.

¹ He has Irish, Spanish, English and Dutch blood in his veins and an English training.

The aim of Pius X, as he himself expressed it, was "to restore all things in Christ," and it would be no fanciful nor unauthentic phrase to say that the Cardinal looked no further than the Gospels for a manual of public policy. Both men believed, in truth, that, whatever prerogatives the Church might properly lay claim to in virtue of her Divine Mission, the days required her to conquer her kingdom afresh—to conquer it as from the beginning and, by the same means that had carried her to victory some nineteen centuries before; by goodness, by patience, by suffering, if need be, the loss of all things, by love unfeigned, by the armour of God on the right hand and on the left. The world was theirs to win again; and it was with Apostolic fervour and evangelical faith that they faced the political problems of their time.

Of these problems the two most urgent, and perhaps also the most interesting, were those connected with the breach of the Concordat in France and with Catholic Action in Italy; and their mention may serve respectively to illustrate the policy of Pius X in its passive and active aspects. When he came to the throne the long accommodation between Church and State which Napoleon had bequeathed to the French Governments of the nineteenth century had plainly spent its strength. Tact and moderation, exemplified in Cardinal Ferrata, who represented the Holy See in France in the last decade of the century, did indeed what they might to stay the storm; and Leo XIII in a conciliatory Encyclical of 1892 discountenanced the plans of the Catholic Monarchists of France by reaffirming that "the civil power, upon every theory, comes from God." But no tact and no moderation could permanently have held back that tide of opinion which is driving our modern societies, with whatever ultimate consequences to themselves, towards a fullness of secularism unparalleled in pagan times. The anti-clerical spirit, born of the French Revolution with its hatred of kings and priests, and fanned on the part of French Conservatives by follies, amongst which their attitude in the Dreyfus affair may be reckoned the greatest, can never be reconciled to that older conception of Church and State (set forth once again by Leo XIII) as kindred institutions bearing to one another the same relation as the soul bears to the body; and the best accommodation that we can look for between the ideas of the Christian and the Secular State for many years to come is one which gives to each party to the issue fair play for its thoughts and no play for its passions. Such an Anglo-Saxon way of handling the matter, even though it falls short of the Catholic ideal of unity in things essential, liberty in things doubtful and charity

in all things whatsoever, was quite beyond the limited political intelligence of the French at that date. As commonly happens, the apostles of freedom showed themselves more incapable of toleration than those whose intolerance they affected to denounce; and the Concordat failed because concord was no longer the end that the secularists had in view. A last attempt to sustain it was made by the Vatican after the enactment by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901 of the Law of Associations. For the sake of peace the religious orders were permitted to conform to the requirements of the new statute, subject only to one or two provisions designed to secure their ancient institutions and distinctive character. This concession might perhaps have delayed a diplomatic rupture if Combes had not immediately replaced Waldeck-Rousseau as head of the French Government. The new Prime Minister, as his predecessor indignantly expressed it, substituted "une loi d'exclusion" for "une loi de contrôle." The separate requests of the threatened orders for permission to remain in France were refused *en bloc* by the Chamber and, to complete the project of religious devastation, it was proposed to suppress all congregations exclusively devoted to religious instruction and to withdraw the right to teach from such congregations as had it.

At this critical juncture, President Loubet decided to return the visit of the King of Italy and flout the injunction of the Vatican against the presence of the heads of Catholic States in Rome. It is a mistake to regard that injunction as no better than a piece of wounded vanity. It was part of the Pope's case against his treatment in 1870 that a national parliament had taken upon itself to settle an international concern, since the freedom of the Church from national influences is nothing less. The action of the French President in setting foot in the Italian capital constituted, therefore, a tacit abandonment by France of the protest which she had hitherto offered, in conjunction with Spain and Austria, to the Italian Law of Guarantees; and we can hardly doubt, in the light of what subsequently occurred, that it was intended as a slap in the face for the Pope. The Vatican, however, did not immediately withdraw its representative from Paris; and the incident might have passed out of memory if the French Ambassador to the Papal Court, acting on the instructions of his Government, had not taken exception to some additional words in the Papal protest, communicated to one of the smaller Catholic Powers and published by M. Jaurès in *L'Humanité*, to the effect that only grave reasons of an exceptional nature had

prevented the recall of the Nuncio.¹ Cardinal Merry del Val, suddenly confronted with this relatively trivial issue, invited the Ambassador to put his representations in writing, promising him an immediate answer. A course which would have satisfied a Government anxious for peace did not, however, commend itself to a Government resolved upon rupture. The French Ambassador took his leave, contenting himself with saying that his country regarded the request for a written interrogatory as an evasion. The French Mission was, however, maintained for some months after the Ambassador had left. Then, on the ground that the Pope had exceeded his powers in summoning the Bishops of Laval and Dijon to Rome in connection with certain ecclesiastical charges against them, the breach was made formally complete. The Separation Law offered the French clergy a precarious tenure and maintenance at the option of a sort of local vestry meeting (*association cultuelle*) in place of the establishment secured to them by the Concordat of 1802 in return for a surrender of the Church property with which the Revolution had made free. There are those who in such circumstances would reflect that half a loaf is better than no bread. The Vatican remembered that man does not live by bread alone; and the offer was rejected.

It remained to blacken the trail of Roman diplomacy. In 1906 the archivist of the former Nunciature in Paris, Mgr. Montagnini, was suddenly expelled from France; his papers were seized; and the press declared itself in a position to inform the public that these had revealed the existence on the part of the expelled Monsignore of a conspiracy in conjunction with certain French priests to defeat the laws of the country. A Parliamentary Commission, it is true, subsequently discovered that the version of the compromising documents published by the newspapers had been garbled, and the examining judge declared the methods followed in their seizure to have been gravely irregular. But it would be unreasonable to expect that such circumstances should be noticed by those—and they are the large majority of us—who are condemned to reach quick conclusions from popular premises.

The subsequent history of the relations between France and the Holy See is not unedifying and may be conveniently summarised here. The French Government, having spoiled the Church of its property, presently discovered the practical inconveniences of the rupture of intercourse; and this most of all when through the break-up of Turkey, the traditional French Protectorate over Catholic interests in the Levant became a diplomatic card of some

¹ See Lavissee, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, VIII, p. 233.

importance. The fact that Perfidious Albion had during the war established a mission to the Vatican could not be ignored and doubtless stimulated the wish for a rapprochement with the Holy See. Eventually in 1920 direct diplomatic relations were resumed, and in 1921 an ambassador was sent in the person of M. Jonnart. This resumption of intercourse has resulted in a modified acceptance by the Vatican of the *fait accompli* in France, where *associations diocésaines* safeguarding the authority of the bishop, have now replaced the *associations culturelles*, but it did not prevent the French from suffering a minor diplomatic reverse over the question of the precedence to be accorded to French consular officials in Palestine. Either on this or other grounds M. Herriot apparently intends to suppress the French Mission to the Holy See. It does not appear to be a sagacious decision, if only because, as Cardinal Merry del Val is once reported to have observed, "France is too great a lady to come up the back-stairs."

The rupture of the Concordat and the breach with the French Government were the outstanding political events of the Pontificate of Pius X, though the development in his time of what is technically called "Catholic Action" in Italy has as great if not so obvious importance. For in Italy, as we must always remember, the perennial problem of Church and State is presented in its most definite outlines, as well as in its most dramatic colours. The constitution of Modern Italy specifically recognises Catholicism as the religion of the State and, if we may take as our guide the census of 1911, when over ninety-five per cent. of the population wrote themselves down as Catholics, Catholicism is also—and this is not invariably the case with established churches nowadays—the religion, so far as they have one, of all but a negligible portion of the citizens. Yet, for all that, the highest authorities in Church and State can neither meet nor entertain official relations, and, at the moment of which we are speaking, Catholics who took their religion seriously were still barred from participating in the public life of the country—from voting, that is, or standing for Parliament by the so-called "Non Expedit" decree of Pius IX issued in 1879.

In this deplorable situation is to be found the genesis of Catholic Action. There remains always to the citizen, even when all the direct avenues to political work are blocked, that less obvious but hardly less important sphere of public activity where thoughts are framed and ideas transmuted, sometimes from base metal into gold, though as often perhaps from gold into base metal. This is the region where committees and congresses

flourish; and it was towards such forms of association that Catholic citizenship had turned in the latter years of Pius IX and during the reign of Leo XIII. That our institutions should be penetrated by Christian feeling and formed on Christian models is the desire of all who would take their stand upon the Gospels; that Christian ideas should be presented in their most definite shape and developed meaning is the aim of the Catholic, or potentially Catholic, spirit. The object of Catholic Action, then, was to throw the full light of Christianity upon the problems of the modern State. Those who would fix its birthday say that it was born four years after the loss of the Temporal Power of the Pope—on June 12th, 1874, to be precise—when the National Catholic Congress was held at Venice. If we accept that date, we may adopt also the observation that the life of Catholic Action began with a thirty years' retreat. For thirty years, so far as it ran in political channels at all, Catholic enthusiasm surveyed a world it could not touch and had no present hope of changing. This was the period of the great Papal Encyclicals on labour, democracy and kindred subjects—Encyclicals of which it is not too much to say that they taught humanity without socialism and a doctrine that was not doctrinaire. The middle way of Christian democracy which the Pope was pursuing, is, however, no broad one; and young Catholic Italy, or those members of it who were led by Don Romolo Murri, found it too narrow for their visions. Seeming to consent to the Pope's teaching, Murri continually deflected its meaning in a socialistic direction; and his activities caused a confusion in the Catholic congresses and committees, and impaired the coherence of their work. Only after Pius X succeeded, however, did this situation come to an issue. A firm but conciliatory intimation from the Cardinal-Secretary that harmony with the Holy See and amongst themselves was required of the adherents of Catholic Action ended in the familiar resort to the method of agreement and difference just described—a device not less useful in life than in logic. This time Murri and his followers had miscalculated. Their proceedings were condemned in the official *Osservatore Romano*, and their President consequently felt himself obliged to resign. On July 30th, 1904, a letter from the Cardinal-Secretary dissolved the old organisation, while retaining the Socio-Economic Union—the insurance-societies, that is, the working-men's clubs and the savings-banks. Two years later Catholic Action was reconstructed on lines calculated to assure the central control of the Holy See and to secure the influence of the Bishops. This reconstitution was notable not only on this

account, but because by the creation of a department under the title of the Electoral Union it made provision for a new policy in regard to the strained relations between Church and State.

In 1904 Pius X had in a single case permitted the use of the Catholic vote in a parliamentary election; in 1909 he authorised a number of exceptions to the general rule; and finally in 1913, whilst in principle the theory of non-participation was maintained, in practice the rule changed places with the exception. In the working of the new arrangement a certain but not an ultimate authority was accorded to the President of the Electoral Union. Of this new orientation of policy one may say generally that it was provoked by the necessities of the State rather than those of the Church. The insufficiency of Liberalism to give coherence to the nation it had done so much to create was becoming already evident; and the assistance of a body of citizens to whom the ideas of unity and order were as the marrow of their bones could no longer be withheld except at a great risk to the country. Already in this thing Italy was disclosing the central feature of a domestic situation now generally apparent—the inability of Liberalism to support the burden of its offspring.

The breach, then, of the Concordat with France and the development of Catholic Action in Italy, illustrating as they do an evangelical indifference to material loss, and an equally evangelical readiness to do the best one may by those who have used one ill, stand out as the most notable events of the reign of one who desired to restore all things in Christ. Of his other political works and all that he did in matters more strictly ecclesiastical neither time nor this place permit to speak. But at the distance of a decade, which has severed us, politically speaking, as by a century from what went before, it is easy to see that his reign was unusually critical and distinguished—critical because the Church was crossing the threshold of another age; distinguished, because his lofty character and admitted strength and singleness of aim were peculiarly well calculated to dispel, so far as this lies within the region of argument and experience, the suspicion that the Vatican is no better than a cabinet of astute politicians. From the Pope himself, as they knew who knew him best, neither were the signs of the times nor was their pregnancy concealed. He foresaw, with the insight of a statesman, the advent of the War and foretold, with the singular instinct or vision that is sometimes to be found in saints, the hour of its approach. 1914 would be, so he declared, the date of the catastrophe; and when, in the spring of that year, Cardinal

Merry del Val ventured to question the danger, he repeated the warning, "Non passiamo il quattordici." But the blow when it came affected him none the less heavily that he had foreseen it. The representative upon earth of a religion that knows neither Jew nor Greek, that would have all men love one another, and every nation look upon the things of others, he bade a sad farewell to those of his spiritual children who were summoned from the seminaries and colleges of Catholic Rome to the standards of the warring nations, whilst to the solicitations of Francis Joseph for a blessing upon the cause of the Central Empires he replied, with a superb simplicity, that he blessed not war but peace. Within a month he was dead, an exceptionally good man, killed, as his intimates thought, by an unusually great adversity.

There is some reason to suppose that the policy of Pius X if he had lived through the War would have differed from that of the Pope who succeeded him. He excelled Benedict XV both in simplicity and strength, and he had the advantage, which in an office like his, at a time such as that, can hardly be over-estimated, of a ten years' pontificate behind him. The moral philosophy of the Church, if I have rightly understood it, whilst it does not attempt to deny that the great offence of war must come, hedges warlike operations in with certain restrictions, which might have been more accurately defined if the Vatican Council of 1870 had been able to run its intended course and discuss its international programme. Broadly speaking the guiding principle of Catholic morality in the particular issue that arose would seem to be the belief that a military objective can only be legitimately pursued when it is specifically indicated. The promiscuous discharge upon unfortified cities of bombs or shells aimed at nothing in especial, or the promiscuous sinking of ships within a certain area by submarine warfare, appears on this basis to fall outside the limitations of what is permissible. Pius X might perhaps have spoken of these things more clearly than was done by Benedict XV. But no one can explore the question even in the most superficial way without perceiving the vast embarrassments that any hasty application of the Catholic theory would have given rise to. A distinguished ecclesiastic who suggested to me in Rome that some restriction of the sort indicated, if imposed by authority upon the consciences of Catholic soldiers, might serve in the future as a lever to restrain non-Catholic governments from coercing their nationals to make use of things forbidden, seemed to me, I must confess, to be living in a world of faith and hope to which I had not the key. Yet it was towards some such end as this that the

clamour against Benedict XV during the War, if it had any practical aim or meaning at all, was presumably directed. Whether that clamour would have been any the less if the Vatican had taken upon itself to decide judicially what was right and what was wrong in regard to the issues that arose and to declare who had violated the laws of humanity and who had not, may well be doubted. The Pope, as Protestants sometimes failed at that time to remember, is not on their showing the arbiter or censor of Christendom, nor even the Patriarch of the West, but the Bishop, if he be so much, of the City of Rome. For even about this last proposition there seems to hang some doubt. "I believe, my Lord"—so a recent Pope is alleged modestly to have remarked to an Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar—"that I am in your diocese."

However this may be, Benedict XV at all events worked along other lines than those prescribed for him by English public opinion. Though his utterances contain from the first some general condemnations of wrong-doing, and even one or two specifically directed against the Germans; though, for example, in January 1915, he denounces "every injustice by whatever side committed," and Cardinal Gasparri, the Papal Secretary, presently amplifies this by saying that "the invasion of Belgium is directly included in the words used by the Holy Father"; though, as Colonel Repington asserts in his *Diary*,¹ there is reason to believe that, had evidence of the alleged mutilation of a Belgian child or the violation of a Belgium nun been procurable, the Pope would have been ready to launch a vigorous protest; and though General Ludendorff during his trial at Munich this year² devoted much of his speech to showing that Roman Catholics were responsible for many of Germany's and Prussia's ills, still Benedict's incontestable aim was to prove himself neutral in the conflict. His reasons for this are obvious. In the first place, and above all he desired to show himself a peace-maker; for peace-making, even if we sometimes forget it, remains one of the paradoxical habits singled out by Christ for benediction. In the second place, neutrality secured for him a large opportunity of human service which must otherwise have been denied to him. Unidentified with either party in the struggle, he was able the better to undertake the works of mercy on behalf of both. To him, in fact, many prisoners owe their exchange, many missing soldiers their discovery, many interned civilians their liberation, and many sick and wounded combatants their best chance of restoration to health. The project of hospital treatment in Switzerland was

¹ *Diary*, II, p. 447.

² 1924.

suggested and accomplished by him, and this single achievement would have caused a man less eminent to be reckoned among the great benefactors of mankind. The fulminations of Justice are no doubt worthy of respect, but Charity has sometimes a more excellent way.

Apart from all this, however, there was a great gulf fixed between the policy of the Pope and that of the belligerents. A long diplomatic experience had taught the Vatican to know the merits of a negotiated peace, but the conduct of a great war was a new thing to democracy; and want of passion seemed a greater peril than shortness of thought. Those who have learned from Mrs. Asquith's *Autobiography*¹ that her husband described Lord Lansdowne's much-abused letter as "excellent and sensible"; who have read Mr. Lloyd George's post-war confession that in July 1914 "no one at the head of affairs quite meant war," that war was, in fact, something into which the governments "glided, or rather staggered and stumbled," and finally who have seen a notorious pacifist placed at the head of the British Government, with the consent, if not the goodwill, of the leaders of the two older parties, and achieving a European settlement which had for six years proved to be beyond the capacity of the advocates of a dictated peace—those who have marked these things will judge the Pope's policy more generously than did contemporary opinion. Peace, as our ancestors seldom forgot in the struggle with Napoleon, is so great a good that it is constantly worth trying for. Nor is the wrath of man so well assured of working the righteousness of God that we can afford to let it go unbridled. In the light of history the Pope's much-abused Peace Note of August 1917, with its unimaginative, old-time phraseology, may even come to seem a nobler thing than the magnificent and moving speeches in which Woodrow Wilson enshrined the case of the Allies. Shakespeare has caused every patriotic heart to beat more quickly by the address of the English King before Agincourt, but he has surely reserved a deeper eloquence and a subtler pathos for the mouth of the King of France, where that sovereign is made to remind his courtiers how at Cressy Edward III "smiled to see" the Black Prince

"Mangle the work of nature, and deface
The patterns that by God and by French fathers
Had twenty years been made."²

War need not be sin, nor victory bring forth a crime, yet for those who have to prove their discipleship by love—for them at

¹ *Autobiography*, II, p. 267.

² *Henry V*, Act II, sc. iv, l. 60.

any rate among all the peoples who dwell upon the earth—peace may well be a passion and negotiation a more excellent, a never wholly-to-be-neglected way. The Pope's Eirenicon must be judged as the work of one who still sustained, amidst every discouragement and disappointment, the standard of a Catholic Christendom. In this respect the Note treated as if it were a living faith that which is so often no more than a journalistic or political convention—the idea of the brotherhood of Christian men. A Lutheran kingdom may, for aught I know, be incapable of responding to such a thought, but it is hardly wise for those to think so who hold the name of Luther in esteem. Or else the Pope might seem to be more charitable towards their brethren than they are themselves.

Thus, then, the sanguine assumption that a Christian civilisation is not yet lost to Christianity underlies the Peace Note. In other respects the Note might be described as a business-like document, not blind to a hope of better things, nor blinded by the *Idealpolitik* (if I may call it so) of those that dream too rashly. It starts by claiming that its author has had three things in view above all: perfect impartiality; the pursuit of the greatest good possible, according to the law of charity, without respect of persons or distinction of nationality or religion; and lastly, a just and lasting peace. The Pope then recalls that from the first he has in general terms exhorted the warring peoples to moderate counsels. But now, after three years of war and in face of a civilisation rushing to ruin with gathering momentum, he turns to the governments with detailed suggestions for a settlement. Where, he asks, are to be sought the bases of a just and lasting peace? And he finds the answer by opening up two lines of conciliation—in the first place the substitution of the force of right for the force of arms by means of mutual disarmament and international arbitration, and in the second place the removal of the barriers to free communication between the nations of the world, amongst which barriers he includes, in a phrase needing more definition than it here receives, the freedom of the seas.

For the rest, reparations, he thinks, will have to be settled, except in some special cases, by mutual condonation; and this condonation is to be recompensed by mutual disarmament. So, again, occupied territories must be restored by both parties—Belgium and the occupied districts of France by Germany and the German colonies by England. These initial acts of restitution should, he holds, pave the way for a fair discussion of the territorial questions in issue between the belligerents—the questions

of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Trentino, and Poland, and so forth. "Everyone recognises," concludes this *vir pietate gravis*, "that on the one side and on the other the honour of arms is safe. Lend, therefore, your ear to our prayer, accept the paternal invitation that we address to you in the name of the Divine Redeemer, the Prince of Peace. Think of your very heavy responsibility before God and man; upon your resolves depend the repose and the joy of innumerable families, the life of thousands of youths, in a word the happiness of the people to whom it is your absolute duty to assure these boons. . . . May Heaven grant that, in deserving the plaudits of your contemporaries, you may gain also for yourselves the name of peace-makers amongst future generations."

The World, or at least the rulers of it, did not share the ambitions of the Pope; and least of all in Germany. There is reason to think that the project of peace might have been welcome to Bethmann-Hollweg and opportune, if the Bolshevik Revolution had not about this time revived the hopes of the German militarists. But it fell in the time of the Chancellorship of Michaelis, that transient and embarrassed phantom, whom the military party set up in the early summer of 1917, but who faded with the fading of the leaf. That Michaelis desired to refuse the Papal Peace Note but to throw the odium of its rejection upon the Entente Powers is rendered something more than a conjecture by the revelations of Philipp Scheidemann;¹ and it is perhaps an equally safe opinion to suppose that Michaelis's disingenuous diplomacy first convinced the Vatican that, if neither group of governments were eager for a peace of mutual understanding, the German Government was certainly the less eager of the two. The War, at any rate after the summer of 1917, became more and more manifestly a fight to the finish, and the Pope for better or worse passed, as the saying is, out of the picture. So far as can be judged from the semi-official utterances of the *Osservatore Romano*, he accepted the outline of the new world sketched in Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January 1918. But neither in the events that led to the German surrender nor the subsequent deliberations in Paris had he any part. He had stood for a negotiated peace, and the world had preferred a dictated one.

There is no way of effectively comparing a policy that has been tried with a policy that has not. There can be no certainty that the Pope's Peace Note, even if it had met with a better Press, even if the Entente Powers had been content with its moderate counsels, could have prevailed against the madness of the Germans

¹ Scheidemann, *Pabst, Kaiser, und Sozialdemokratie*.

or their rulers. Yet no future critic is likely to contend that the crushing downfall of "the Kaiser" has proved a panacea for human ills or the dictated Treaty of Versailles a model of human wisdom. Against such advantages as that last year of the War secured, he is likely to set the loss of the flower of our time; the starved, unlovely childhood of many innocent children; the long paralysis of industry through which old men have lost their recompense and young men their opportunity; the enlarged opportunity of Bolshevism; the intensification every way of the unrest that saps our purposes, of the griefs that impair our strength, of the bitterness that kills all good, of the desire of vengeance that passes to and fro between nation and nation and between class and class, compelling us to pay the price of pride and self-sufficiency. Against such evils he will, if he is just, say that Benedict strove to guard, doing what a Christian might to bring men to a kinder mind and Christendom to self-consciousness. And he may furthermore take occasion to observe that Benedict received his promised reward—that he was reviled and spoken against, and made safe from the condemnation that lies against those of whom all men speak well in this world, and ready, so far as human eyes can see, to receive the blessing that is promised to the peace-makers in another.

This pacific Pope died in the January of 1922, and, contrary to the expectation of his critics, transmitted to his successor, Mgr. Ratti, who now reigns as Pius XI, a diplomatic inheritance singularly strengthened by the outcome of the War. "The devil," Cardinal Gasparri is said to have observed some little while ago, "cannot really be so competent as one supposes, for all the evil of the last few years has resulted in our deliverance from our three worst enemies—the Tsar, the Kaiser, and the Caliph." Among the forces represented by these three figures that of Russia was from the standpoint of the Vatican the most formidable. Had Constantinople been added to the Empire of the Romanovs, had Santa Sophia been wrested from the followers of Mohammed and the Patriarch of New Rome been brought under the influence of the Holy Synod, the ecclesiastical problems of the East must have been indefinitely complicated. As things are, the downfall of that which we have long, if incorrectly, styled the Tsardom has opened to the Church a new and it may be not unfruitful field in the frost-bound steppes of Russia, where an age-long stagnation of dogma has caused morality to grow faint. Not less has Rome been the gainer by the transfer of the Holy Places of Jerusalem from the hands of the Turks to those of Great Britain as the

mandatory of the League of Nations, and the resulting disappearance of the old French Ecclesiastical Protectorate which, as Cardinal Gasparri's studies¹ had given him the best reason to know, was based upon nothing more lasting than the presence of the Infidel in the Holy Land and the at one time superior ability of the French to afford protection to the Christian population of the Levant. A tolerant and generous foe is no bad exchange for a false friend and, if the cordial observations of the *Osservatore Romano* upon the British entry into Jerusalem may be taken to reflect the mind of the Vatican, we may suspect that Protestant England is regarded in that quarter as a better Power to have to do with than pseudo-Catholic France.

The quarrel between England and the Holy See is indeed an old story which has lost its bitterness; and the War gave the British Government the chance of burying a rusty hatchet. Since Carne was withdrawn in the days of Elizabeth there had been no formally accredited representative of this country at the Papal Court. The appointment, therefore, of a Minister—in the first place Sir Henry Howard and subsequently Count de Salis, both of them Catholic diplomatists of repute, and the latter a man of remarkable insight—to represent great Britain at the Vatican was an act of striking, if by no means disinterested goodwill and would by itself have served to make the pontificate of Benedict XV notable in the annals of the Holy See. As we have seen, the presence of a British Representative accredited to the Pope in all probability contributed something to the revival of diplomatic relations between France and the Papacy, but the impression was further reaching than that and may be held responsible, not less than recent changes in the map of Europe, for that recent, extraordinary growth of diplomatic missions to the Vatican, from fourteen to twenty-six, amongst which that of Japan—a remote and pagan but astute and vigilant Power—must be regarded as one of the signs of the times. Critics there will always be of Lord Grey's decision to send and Lord Curzon's decision to maintain our Legation to the Holy See, but they will not be found amongst men who have power to pass behind the obvious. No less a name than Burke's can, in fact, be quoted in favour of the conclusion which it took lesser men a full century and a great War to reach. "If the thing depended on me," the English Aristotle wrote in 1793,² "I should certainly enter upon diplomatic

¹ See *Il Protettorato Cattolico della Francia nell' Oriente . . . studio storico giuridico di un prelato Romano*, 1904.

² See Cardinal Gasquet, *Great Britain and the Holy See*. Rome, 1919. Descles 26.

relations with the Court of Rome in a much more open and legitimate manner than has hitherto been attempted. If we refuse it, the bigotry will be on our side and most certainly not on that of His Holiness. Our unnatural alienation has produced, I am convinced, great evil and prevented much good. If the present state of the world does not make us learn something our error is much more culpable." Wise and disinterested words for which the Catholic Church may well be grateful, and of which neither Church nor State in England have need to feel ashamed ! In the light of them we may welcome the continuance of the British Mission beyond the period of the War, the official visit in 1923 of the British Sovereign to the Pope, when the felicity of the arrangements discovered to some of the onlookers the unrivalled experience of the Papal Court in matters of ceremonial, and the selection of a non-Catholic to succeed the two Catholic diplomatists who have been named. Sir Odo Russell, as he decided to call himself, has revived the tradition and the name of his father, who in the latter days of the temporal power acted as British Agent in Rome. "E vero," Pius IX is reported to have remarked of the first Lord Amphill with a characteristic touch of his lambent wit, "E vero; non e Cattólíco, ma protestante pessimo"; and a man of whom that could be said in those times would not be ill-equipped to represent the British people at the Papal Court in these. For, unless I am mistaken, there is at their wisest a sort of imperial kinship between the politics of the Papal and British Governments, a terrestrial catholicism of outlook, a common detachment from the purely nationalist and frequently Machiavellian attitude of the greater continental States, a standpoint where the ideal of the *Pax Britannica* does not seem too remote from that of the *Pax Romana*. This approximation of policy might be illustrated from a letter of the present Pope, addressed to Cardinal Gasparri in June 1923: "We conjure those," he said, "who hold in their hands the destinies of the peoples once again to examine the different questions, and particularly the question of reparations, in that Christian spirit which does not set a dividing line between reasons of justice and the reasons of social charity on which the perfection of civil society is based. If and when the debtor . . . gives proof of his serious will to make a fair and definite agreement, involving an impartial judgment as regards the limits of his own capacity to pay and undertaking to hand over to the judges every means of true and exact control, then justice and social charity as well as the very interests of the creditors . . . seem to require that no demand shall be made from

the debtor that he cannot meet without entirely exhausting his resources and his capacity for production. . . ."

Utterances like this furnish the best apologetic for the British Mission to the Vatican. Peace has not so many friends that it can afford the friendship of any of its prophets to fall out of repair; whilst the history of the relations between the League of Nations and the Vatican supplies in this connection, if that be needed, the study of a great mistake. From indifference, or prejudice, or shortness of thought, the Pope was not invited to participate in the counsels of the League. Yet its best advocates are now but too well aware of the value attaching to Catholic support, above all in America, where Catholics are many and whole-hearted supporters of the League are, at least relatively, few. The error that has been made is in all probability not irreparable, and the presence of a Papal representative at Geneva in an advisory capacity may some day serve to correct an unfortunate impression. It is an error the less pardonable that there could have been no question of the acceptance of formal membership of the League on the part of the Holy See. And this for two reasons. The members of the League are pledged in certain eventualities to the use of coercion; and the Papacy has neither force at its disposal nor the will to use it in international quarrels. Also there are issues, amongst which we may guess that the Roman Question would be one, that the Church would not consent to submit to any tribunal for decision.

Yet, even had all civility been shown, there must still have remained obvious difficulties to overcome before these two great instruments of goodwill towards men could have drawn together. The League is young and enthusiastic, the Church old and experienced. A measure of scepticism about the one must be permitted to the other. It is impossible but that a body which converted the public law of Rome to the uses of Christianity and made of it the code of Christendom, should perceive how ill-situated is a heterogeneous League of Nations to deal scientifically with the deeper problems of cosmopolitanism—with definitions, for example, of peace and justice, with their relation the one to the other, and their respective place in our philosophy; with the problem upon which foundation that structure of international morality which the League is feeling after should be laid—whether, as the canonists and the Roman jurists before them supposed, upon the basis of a national law common to all the peoples of the earth, or only, as Vattel and Bentham would have held, upon a body of international agreements and understandings in which every nation is

its own arbiter of right and wrong; with the question, again, so vital after all to such idealism as that of the League, upon what rational grounds of faith we can require the stronger nations of the world to quit the too familiar paths of natural selection for a more humane, a more catholic science of public ethics.

Immense questions which in one shape or another must challenge the League and which it can neither at present determine nor ultimately altogether shun. Immense questions, about which the Church has long ordered and directed its thoughts, developing them gradually after its manner in accordance with changed times and new conditions, as may be seen in that re-statement of the old public law of Christendom which, under the title of the Vatican codex of 1917, Pius X and Benedict XV caused to be put forth, and inferred from the expectation that Pius XI may within the next few years reassemble the summarily-adjourned Vatican Council of 1870 to discuss such international problems of War and Peace as lay upon its agenda, but in the event were left untouched. For the rest, it is in point to remember, as Seeley has told us in words not yet grown old, that the great forces which bind communities together are those of interest, of race, and of religion.¹ The League is possessed of the first—of the interest of peace, so far as men desire it. In the nature of things it cannot have the second; it cannot have the bond of race. What has it to say to the third? Is not religion the life-blood of any movement that would establish the brotherhood of men and teach every nation to look disinterestedly upon the things of others? To Catholics, at least, it must seem as if only a catholic faith could furnish the foundation of a catholic society. Nor can we be surprised if to the authorities of a Church, which at its worst moments has never feared to display the name and symbols of Christ, a great interrogation-mark should seem to hang above the work of an assembly that hesitates so much as to name the name of God. For not thus were the great victories of a Christian civilisation originally won.

Amongst those of whose presence in Rome during the Great War Great Britain has reason to make mention, Cardinal Gasquet is prominent. Entrusted with the revision of the text of the Vulgate, he afforded to this country the rare advantage of a Cardinal in Curia at a time when the possession of such a dignitary was of unusual value. His rejoinder to Cardinal Hartmann, when that prelate unexpectedly presented himself at the Palazzo San Calisto, in the early days of the struggle, has become classic. "Your Eminence," said the German, "let us not speak

¹ *Political Science*, p. 70.

of war." "Neither, your Eminence," said the Englishman, "let us speak of peace." Less familiar, but as witty and not less apt, was his designation as "the g(u)ilty image" of that new gilded statue of Victor Emmanuel which, standing up incongruously above the Capitol, commemorates the overthrow of the Pope's temporal power by a striking encroachment upon the realm of art.

The Cardinal's epigram, whatever we may think of it, fitly introduces the third and last section of this paper. Just as the breach of the Concordat and the development of Catholic Action fix the eye as the leading issues in the pontificate of Pius X, and the War and the League in that of Benedict XV, so does the Roman Question stand out in the pontificate of the present Pope.

In those same apartments in the Palace of San Calisto, where Cardinal Hartmann met his match, one might have caught from time to time a glimpse of Monsignor, or, as he had become before the close of Benedict's reign, of Cardinal Ratti. The love and care of books had made him intimate with Cardinal Gasquet, and he was accustomed to visit his old friend as occasion offered. Such an opportunity occurred during the Conclave which followed the death of Benedict. As the two men parted, the Englishman observed that the pleasure of the evening's conversation had been marred for him by the reflection that it was likely to be the last time that his guest would come there. The other in surprise asked him what he meant? "In a week's time," replied Cardinal Gasquet, "we shall have locked you up for good in the Vatican." He was not mistaken. The lot fell upon Cardinal Ratti, and he was numbered amongst the Popes. Though many able men have sat in the seat of St. Peter, none of equal learning has been found there for many years past. And to the gift of knowledge they who know him best would, I believe, maintain that this climber of mountains (now, so far as one can see, confined for all his remaining days within the limits of a garden) adds in a marked degree the gift of a calm and deliberate judgment. For the rest, his courtesy wins all affections. I cannot forget witnessing his behaviour at a public audience. It is the custom on such occasions for all who attend to kneel as the Pope passes round, offering his ring to each in turn to kiss. I noticed that one man, as if in protest, had remained standing in a corner of the room, just behind the kneeling line. The Pope neither passed him by, nor did the attendants bid him mind his manners. Christianity has after all its own way of dealing with insults. It seemed to me an act in perfect harmony with all that he is here to represent when, after pausing for a fraction of a second, Pius XI lifted his

hand over the heads of the ninety and nine just persons who did him honour to tender it to the single wayward objector who disdained his office.

It was perhaps this superb charity of soul that led the Pope at his accession to offer again to the City and the World the lapsed courtesy of the Papal Blessing. There were those who took it for the prelude to an abandonment of the old, irreconcilable attitude of the Papacy towards the new régime which had deprived it of its temporalities. But it was not so intended, and Pius XI has since had occasion to show how scrupulously careful he is not to pass outside the recognised precincts of the Vatican. For Papal Rome does not believe that right and wrong are objectively altered by the passing of years, but only that, as generations pass, the moral responsibility is subjectively modified. Other circumstances, however, have contributed to make both sides to the quarrel envisage the Roman Question otherwise than they did at the time of the making of Modern Italy. Time in the first place has disentangled the essence of the problem from its setting. The essence of the problem is that the Pope should be free, and that his freedom to be catholic should be every whit as well assured as Italy's freedom to be national. Any suspicion of local control in his counsels is gravely prejudicial to his position as the Vicar of One whose thoughts are not limited as our thoughts by race and country; and the scandals of the Papacy in the Middle Age—the Babylonish Captivity and the Great Schism—are there to make this plain. The Papal States, so long as they existed, safeguarded the Pope's freedom, not perfectly but yet sufficiently, and, when the Temporal Power was suppressed, the makers of Modern Italy were not wholly blind to the fact that they had to deal with an international problem needing the concurrence of other Catholic States. In fact, however, the Law of Guarantees, which regulates (so far as that can be done by the act of one side only) the relation between the Papacy and the Kingdom of Italy, was passed by an Italian Parliament alone. No Sovereign State—and the Papacy had for centuries been nothing less—could with dignity allow a local law to take the place of an international treaty, and least of all a local law which does not even (as it is sometimes wrongly supposed to do) guarantee to the Pope sovereign rights over the palaces of the Vatican, the Lateran and the Villa of Castel Gandolfo, but merely provides that he shall continue to enjoy these residences at the pleasure of the Italian Government.

Those who wish to understand the technical aspects of the

question must begin by appreciating that the sovereign rights accorded to the Pope by the law of 1871 are purely personal and that, in the view of the Italian statesmen of that time, the status of the Pope was intended to approximate to that of a foreign sovereign residing upon Italian soil. To this the Pope was never likely to agree, for it is a *sine qua non* of any satisfactory settlement that he should be master in his own house.

Of the reasonableness of this point of view Modern Italy has of late become aware, partly because the War brought into clearer light the intrinsic defects of the settlement of 1871, and partly because the philosophy of Liberalism which dictated that settlement is everywhere on the decline. The Law of Guarantees made full provision for the presence on Italian soil of Foreign Missions accredited to the Holy See, giving them diplomatic status and extra-territorial rights, but it did not attempt to forestall the situation which was bound to occur as soon as Italy found herself at war with a Power still desiring to maintain diplomatic relations with the Papacy. When indeed this situation actually arose in 1915, nothing less than the combined tact of the Papal and Royal Governments could have saved it. Whilst conveying to the Vatican that it would faithfully honour the pledges of the Law of Guarantees, the Italian Administration allowed the Representatives at the Papal Court of Prussia, Bavaria and Austria to understand that it could not make itself responsible for their safety from the attacks of an excited populace. The diplomatists concerned thereupon represented that they might perhaps be housed in the Vatican Palace, but the proposal was met with a polite refusal. In these circumstances they settled for themselves the difficulties of their position by retiring to Lugano, where for the remainder of the War they maintained relations with the Holy See through the medium of a Papal Nuncio in Switzerland. The plan, however, had its obvious disadvantages and was believed to have been in part responsible for Pope Benedict's unfortunate tenacity in retaining Mgr. Gerlach, an Austrian of dubious character, as one of his chamberlains. Gerlach, suspected by the Italian authorities of intriguing with the enemy, was eventually escorted to the frontier, and his case tried *in camera* after his departure by an Italian Military Court. He was found guilty and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment, but the subsequent history of the witnesses upon whose evidence he was condemned is scarcely more edifying than his own; and his offences, whatever they were, were admitted by the Court to have been unconnected with his official duties.

Such inconvenient incidents as these exemplified the general inconvenience of living with one's neighbour on terms which are neither terms of peace nor yet of war, and calling him free and equal whilst all the while trying to fetter his independence. Nothing more, indeed, is needed to expose the insincerity of the settlement of 1871 than a clause in the Pact of London of 1915—which pledges the Entente Powers to support Italian opposition to any representation of the Holy See in the peace negotiations or even in any discussion of the issues arising out of the War. The clause, unless I am misinformed, though accepted by Lord Grey, was less acceptable to Lord Grey's successor. It reflected the mind of Baron Sonnino—that strange, intriguing figure in whose veins there ran, beside his country's blood, the blood of Scot and Hebrew—but not, there is some reason to suppose, the mind of the Premier, Signor Salandra. The latter, it is worth remembering, stood in a closer relation to the Vatican than his Foreign Minister, if they are right who say that communications between the Papal and Royal Governments passed as a rule through the medium of Baron Monti, the Director of the *Fondo del Culto*. However that may be, and however well a *sub rosa* understanding between the two Powers may sometimes have worked, there can be no doubt that Italy has become uncomfortable at seeing all the Greater Powers of the Eastern Hemisphere represented at the Vatican and herself shut out. Her feeling on this point burst at last into uncontrollable expression after the appointment of M. Jonnart as French Ambassador to the Holy See in the summer of 1921; and the Press became busy with debate. So vivid and so remarkable was the public interest in this attempt to reopen the Roman Question, that the Italian Foreign Office took the unusual step of collecting and issuing in pamphlet form the principal newspaper opinions upon the subject.¹ Amongst these, two stood out pre-eminent—that of the *Messaggero*, a journal notably influential, democratic and anti-clerical, and that of *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Vatican. The argument of the *Messaggero* was based upon a fact and a faith—the fact, already sufficiently stressed, that all the greater Powers, the United States alone excepted, and many smaller Powers enjoy direct diplomatic representation at the Vatican; the faith that Italy had emerged from the War strong enough and mature enough to envisage a problem that had itself undergone a transformation. It might have been a defence more broadly based to have said that Italy

¹ *Una nuova discussione sui rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato in Italia*. Roma: Libreria di Scienze e Lettere. Piazza Madame 19-20.

had grown willing to learn and anxious to forget; that the Fascist Movement, whose Hour was approaching and whose Man was already visible, was teaching anew what the liberal theorists had let slip from the theory of the State; and that the Papal side of the Roman Question had in the calm light of history begun to disclose, to Italian eyes at least, a force and justice not previously perceived. Be this as it may, the *Osservatore Romano* was plainly entitled to claim as a result of the article in the *Messaggero* and the discussion to which it gave rise, that "the Roman Question exists and that it is in the interest of Italy to settle it." It followed, as the writer of the article in the *Osservatore*—the Conte Delle Torre—went on to maintain, that the unilateral Law of Guarantees had fallen out of date and that a territorial solution was both possible and necessary.

To such a point, then, had the long struggle between the Papacy and the Kingdom of Italy been brought after fifty years of protest. Pope after Pope had repeated in unswerving language that the very nature of the Papacy necessitates a full freedom and true sovereignty. But no tinge of bitterness nor shred of what men might mistake for worldly ambition clings any more to the demand; and in the view of the Vatican authorities the territorial autonomy that they seek can be received back only from the willing hands of those whose fathers took it away. Some observations of Cardinal Gasparri's, made during the year in which Italy joined the Allies, illustrate this attitude of mind with great felicity. "The Holy See," said the Cardinal-Secretary, "has no intention at all of creating difficulties for the Italian Government and puts its trust in God, expecting the convenient systematisation of the situation, not from foreign arms but from the triumph of those sentiments of justice which it hopes will spread more and more amongst the Italian people in conformity with their true interests." Seven years later, in 1922, Pius XI will be found saying the same thing even more simply and directly: "Italy will never have to fear hurt from the Holy See."

Of this generous disposition towards the Italian people, as well as out of the harsh anxieties of the times, was born the relaxation and ultimate removal of the old ban upon the participation of Catholics in civic life. Catholic Action, the development of which has already been traced under Benedict XV, seized this larger opportunity and brought forth the *Partito Popolare*, the Popular Party, which, under the guidance of a priest, Don Sturzo, though without any official recognition from the Vatican, endeavoured to translate Catholic social theories into practical politics. The

new movement might have met with better fortune if it had not been almost instantly eclipsed by the rise of the Fascisti, in whose programme the recognition of religion and the settlement of the Roman Question alike found a place. Mussolini spoke of both these things with that uncompromising courage and directness that are part of the secret of his strength. Dismissing without ceremony the old, absurd, rhetorical phrases of Carducci about the Pope—"the blood-stained Vatican wolf," "the black Pontiff of mystery"—or at least relegating them contemptuously to the sphere of imaginative literature, the master of Modern Italy went on to declare that from the "eminently unprejudiced" standpoint of Fascism "the Latin and Imperial tradition of to-day is represented by Catholicism," and "that if, as Mommsen said some thirty years ago, one cannot stay at Rome without a universal idea . . . the only universal idea which exists to-day in Rome is that which emanates from the Vatican."

Strange words in the mouth of one who has sat in the seat of Cavour and enjoyed the popularity of Garibaldi—and yet not so strange if we find in the success of Fascism a tardy admission of that other body of political doctrine—true in its proper setting like most other political ideas that have held the imagination of men—which is involved in the much-abused Syllabus of Pius IX and has been so unwittingly vindicated by much of the history of the last few years! The olive branch was not embraced nor yet rejected. Not without reserves, not without recalling to mind Leonardo da Vinci's warning that "a crime unpunished is a crime intended,"¹ the Vatican has shown itself friendly to the government of Mussolini; and with good dispositions on either side nothing is impossible. There are some indeed who, like M. Jean Carrère, the author of a much-read book, published this year under the title of *Le Pape*, and alleged to have been not unsympathetically read by that high dignitary, look forward to a settlement under which the Papacy would receive in full sovereignty a territorial dominion—perhaps a strip of land, reaching to the sea, so as to insure communication with the outer world, perhaps only a few modest acres, just broad enough to contain the Foreign Missions accredited to the Holy See. The Vatican, as we have seen, is not greedy for soil, though tenacious of sovereignty; and it is possible that such a settlement as this might be arranged upon a peninsula where already there exists, almost unperceived, the Republic of San Marino. To have

¹ See *The Times*. Oct. 14, 1924, p. 13, column 3, quoting *Osservatore Romano*.

done with the old dispute, to remove the blot upon a lofty "scutcheon" and chase the shadow from a generous and ennobling dream, must indeed appeal to every patriot heart and every statesmanlike ambition. Crispi's words remain on record, "that he would be the greatest of Italian statesmen who solved the Roman Question." And one of the greatest of Italian statesmen is here.

But Time passes for Mussolini as for all men; and that which is not achieved when popularity is at the full is less likely to be accomplished when power is waning. When all has been said, the fact remains that the two parties interested are reaching out hands to one another across an unbridged gulf of sentiment. The Papacy, though it seeks no subjects and desires no new administrative burdens, can never abate its claim to full sovereignty over a territory however small, whilst Italy, though she would suffer no appreciable loss by surrendering a few acres that even now she dare not occupy, will bring herself only with the greatest difficulty to abandon one tiniest fraction of that which has once been claimed as Italian soil. So it is not impossible that these two Powers, who bear one another no true ill-will, may rest divided, until some new convulsion has passed across the face of the Eternal City, by the barrier of a little earth.

If, in conclusion, we are concerned to ask which Power of the two occupies the stronger diplomatic position, the answer can hardly be in doubt. The Vatican has but little to gain by a settlement. To financial considerations it has shown from the first the same honourable indifference that it afterwards manifested in regard to the breach of the Concordat with France. Release from a voluntary imprisonment would indeed give the Pope the most coveted of modern blessings—a change of air—but that amenity might have to be paid for by an increase of those petty activities that poison the life of public men all the world over, and by a loss of that majestic isolation, within the very confines of the Eternal City, which at present invests his person, so far as circumstances can do so, with the peculiar character of being in the world and yet not of it. The existing arrangement, though it could never form the basis of an equitable settlement, does not work too badly, so long as the protest of the Church against any sort of localisation of the Papacy in a secular State is maintained. When all has been said the Pope remains a far greater figure in Rome than any King of Italy can hope to be—the greatest of all Roman monuments, the oldest living of all Roman traditions, the most imperial of all Roman forces, and, if it comes to that, the most profitable of all

Roman assets—so that there is nothing the Italian Government is less in a position to do than to throw him out. Let them speak to this predominance of the Papal over the Royal position who witnessed the recent stay in Rome of the sovereigns of Spain and England and could take account of the place that public imagination accorded to their visits to the Vatican, guests as they were of the King of Italy, even though temporarily divested of that character by a diplomatic fiction. Rome without the Pope—he must be blind who does not see it—would be as the famous representation of *Hamlet* with the principal actor left out. And for that reason, if for no other, whilst the Quirinal would be glad to settle, the Vatican can well afford to wait. It was a wise man with great opportunities of observation who remarked to me in this connection, that it was no bad thing to have a grievance; and one might add that it is an even better thing to have a grievance about which the offender has become uneasy. Time brings its revenges, and at times very subtle revenges; and the admonition to agree with one's adversary quickly, whilst one is in the way with him, is advice which a nation sometimes has subsequent cause to reflect upon when it pits local force against world-wide opinion. Thus then the matter might seem to stand if the issue is tried in secular balances alone. Yet who can say? These are not perhaps the only weights required, where we have to deal with one who is the accredited champion of "peace and goodwill amongst men," and with whom, if equity be once established, charity may the more abound.

At this point, a paper unduly extended may properly conclude. Much more might be said, much more, indeed, if the subject were to be thoroughly dealt with, would require to be said. Yet I shall not have wholly failed if I have persuaded any that an institution, the oldest living of all we know, whose voice goes out into all lands and whose information is drawn from sources infinitely more numerous than any that a merely secular government can command, is one which no student of politics can afford to neglect and no statesman would be wise to ignore. It does not, indeed, furnish the stuff of an international romance or a Protestant drama. The Vatican is neither rich nor crafty, nor the seat of secret conspiracies for the subjugation of mankind, nor yet a government organised to some surpassing pitch of administrative perfection. It lives pretty much from hand to mouth, and not too well at that. It has no deeper policy, no darker end than "to restore all things in Christ," though it finds the channel of that policy, the means to that end, in the existence of a visible Church

and a well-defined creed; whilst of its administrative machinery it was said to me by a well-qualified observer: "that Englishmen would run it better." Those indeed who see the Papacy in its true perspective will be the least inclined to attribute its age-long influence and perpetual vitality to mere human astuteness or sacerdotal craft. Not with such simplicity are its mysteries explained! Century by century men foretell its failure, and ever and again it renews its youth. It seems to fall back continually, only to leap forward once more. It loses half a continent and sets to work to win a hemisphere. Its temporalities are seized; its chief is driven into retirement; its dogmas are derided. Yet from out the great convulsion of our time, when strong kingdoms were cast down and ancient dynasties tottered and fell, it emerges the more venerable that all the Cæsars of yesterday have gone the way of the Cæsars before them; whilst, after long warfare with its critics, it lives to see the work of the Tridentine Council much praised in our most independent and most progressive weekly as the last serious attempt to order life upon a general theory,¹ or, as we might say in more familiar language, to see life steadily and see it whole.

Of such a Power as this which, unarmed, survives the kingdoms of the earth and in range of sovereignty has yet surpassed them all, an age like ours, whose wisest leaders seek to think catholically, must needs take some account. You will forgive me—a Catholic in a more technical sense than theirs—if I add, even though I cannot hope to engage all sympathies, that I believe this Power, within the limits of the visible world, to be that one which makes for righteousness above the rest.

ALGERNON CECIL.

¹ *New Statesman*, Sept. 20, 1919, p. 619.

THE ABSORPTION OF ALSACE AND LORRAINE

EVER since the French Revolution unity and uniformity throughout French territory have formed the main dogma of French political thought. Upon this basis Napoleon grafted the system of highly centralised administration which carried France, safely and efficiently, through half a dozen revolutions and a kaleidoscopic succession of rapidly changing governments down to the present day. French attachment to these conceptions is, therefore, both natural and reasonable, even though in these times of increasing State interference the drawbacks of excessive centralisation are making themselves felt. It was an inherent consequence of their reunion with the Mother-country that Alsace and Lorraine were to be absorbed into and identified with this system of unity and centralisation. Nor was any voice ever raised against this principle in the redeemed provinces.

This, in itself, is no mean proof of the unfeigned "Frenchness" of the border departments. For we must remember that during nearly half a century before the Armistice of 1918, Alsace and Lorraine had been isolated and forced into a separate development, based upon incomplete, but, more or less recognised, local autonomy. Yet, without a sign of regret or reflection, the redeemed populations abandoned this partial independence. In the stirring days of November 1918 their local Parliament voluntarily dissolved, having previously, unanimously and solemnly, in the name of the whole people, incorporated their native land with the beloved Mother-country, of which, in their hearts, it had never ceased to form part.

Perhaps I may here pause a moment to answer a question which has been repeatedly asked me, since my last return from Eastern France. "Granted, people will say, that in the enthusiasm of the Armistice days there was only one voice for reunion with France—is that still so to-day? In these six years the Alsatians and Lorrainers must have had time to compare some of their present troubles with the best points of the German régime. Has it affected their loyalty? Are they not, in fact, German in race, perchance in sympathies? Do they regret nothing?" It would carry me beyond the subject of this

evening's discussion were I to formulate detailed replies to these and kindred questions. Suffice it to summarise the impressions of my visit, during which I had opportunities of meeting people holding all shades of political and religious views: militant Roman Catholics and more placid Protestants; Agnostics who merely wanted to be left to their trades, and Jews who took an active part in politics; men who had served in the German army and others who had shared the hardships of the French *poilu*; men, again, to whom French was the only tongue they spoke, and others who understood it not at all, and were only too happy to find that I could converse with them in German and even gather the gist of their friendly patois. There were those who, in the tragic conflict of pre-war days, had chosen to leave their native land, to sever the ties with their families, that they might serve the French cause in France. And others who, with an equal sense of high loyalty, had elected to suffer all and serve Germany, that they might the better serve France in Alsace or Lorraine. It would require the genius of a Maurice Barrès to describe the conflicts that have raged within the souls of these equally high-minded men, but it needs only a very little human understanding to grasp the sense of relief and freedom which is theirs to-day. But, much as I was told of past conflicts of conscience and present anxieties, there was one thing which not one deemed it worth while to point out: his loyalty to France. It was taken for granted and not considered a matter for argument. And the effect was more impressive than any affirmations could have made it. The liberty with which they criticised, even before a foreigner, certain details of French administration or legislation, seemed the measure of their unbounded loyalty to the general idea of unity with France.¹

Perhaps the opinion of a German upon this matter may be of even greater value. Herr Grauthoff, a German writer, confided to the *Vossische Zeitung* of June 4th, 1924, his bitter disappointment after revisiting Strasbourg. He describes in detail how "French" in outer life as well as at heart he found the whole population. He tells with what scant sympathy he was received after making himself known as a German, and wonders whether his countrymen ought to know the real truth. "Is it right," he questions, "that our people should build up illusions which might, once again, lead to their undoing? Ought I to call the

¹ It may here be apposite to observe in passing that the Alsatians and Lorrainers always refer to the remainder of France as "the Interior," and only use the words "France" and "the French" when they intend to include the three border departments and themselves.

Germans to the assistance of Alsace? . . . You may stone me, O my countrymen, but I shall, nevertheless, throw up into your faces the truth from which I suffered out there: *Alsace does not want us; the Alsatians are lost to us.*" And again in discussing the education question this German witness bitterly remarks: "*The assimilation has been achieved faster than even the French themselves expected.*" Testimony, so reluctantly given, needs no elaboration.¹

This unfeigned desire for complete assimilation was the basis upon which the administrative genius of the French began to build up the desired uniformity. It must be remembered that the laws of the redeemed provinces are varied in their origin. Until 1870 they had, in the main, followed the general legislation of France. This solid body of enactments and decrees was maintained by the German rulers. In fact, when the French troops entered Alsace and Lorraine in November 1918, there were still over 800 French laws on the Statute Book of the late *Reichsland*. These ranged from Henry II's decree of 1607, concerning the powers of his "Grand Master of the Roads," to the last legislative measures passed by the Second Empire in 1870. To these had since been added the Imperial laws of the German *Reich*, as well as the local legislation of Alsace and Lorraine, established, at least in later years, with the aid of a provincial Parliament. Many of the latter were not only eminently suited to the specific requirements of these provinces, but contained provisions superior to any to be found either in France or Germany.

It was, therefore, only natural that the desire for unification with France should, in the minds of the border populations, not have excluded the possibility of retaining some of the good points of their local institutions by applying these to the whole of France. In this respect it may be mentioned that at the request of the principal towns of the "Interior," the Alsatian municipal legislation has been maintained *in statu quo*, in the hope that the somewhat antiquated French law may eventually be altered on similar lines. For like reasons, under pressure from lawyers all over the country, the Alsatian Code of Civil Procedure is also

¹ Before leaving this subject it should be added that in the elections last May, 21 out of the 24 seats allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in the French Chamber were filled by deputies who supported the Poincaré-Millerand policy, whilst not a single autonomist candidate even presented himself.

The same loyalty pervades the younger generation in that important test: their conduct as soldiers in the French army. Here statistics show that out of the 11,000 recruits comprising the 1923 class, only 88 cases of disobedience (of all kinds) occurred, an extremely low figure.

Finally, one finds that taxation is paid in the border provinces with a promptness unequalled in the "Interior."

being left in force, as an encouragement to remodel its French counterpart which, excellent in its day, has been largely rendered out-of-date owing to the changed conditions of modern life. There are other examples of a similar nature which justify in practice, even from an exclusively French point of view, the general idea of the Alsatians and Lorrainers about legislative unification.

In general, however, the accepted policy has been to apply existing French legislation fully to the redeemed departments. Usually transitional measures are found necessary. These cannot be introduced without a "legislative decree" issued by the President of the Republic with parliamentary approval. M. Millerand, then Commissioner-General for Alsace-Lorraine, with statesmanlike far-sightedness and administrative skill of a high order, introduced a system which reduced the necessity for action in Paris to a mere formality. In conjunction with a Consultative Council, widely representative of local interests, the authorities at Strasbourg worked out the Bills to be submitted to the Central Government in Paris. Whilst these Bills were presented upon the sole responsibility of the Commissioner-General, the consent so happily secured, in advance, removed them beyond the pale of party considerations and enabled their enactment in Paris to be speedily accomplished without even the necessity for discussion in Parliament. Thus, in the five years since the system was started, over 500 French laws have been introduced in Alsace-Lorraine without giving rise to the slightest disagreement or friction. It is an achievement of which the French Government may well be proud and one which has, in no small measure, contributed to M. Millerand's personal popularity in the eastern departments. It is likewise a solid proof of the sound common sense of the Alsatians and Lorrainers and of their unflinching desire for complete assimilation with France. It is, lastly, a clear indication that nothing short of unwarranted clumsiness need hamper the complete absorption by France of the provinces reunited to her.

Among the matters which had been allowed to remain *in statu quo* was that of the relation between the State and the Churches. Like all questions touching religious convictions, this one is fundamental and of far greater importance than those purely economic problems which bulk so largely in the present-day press and politics, and which yet are no more than the surface waves produced by the clash of deep-running religious and anti-religious under-currents. To understand the actual situation on this point

in Alsace and Lorraine it is necessary to recall a few facts about anti-clericalism in France in the past. Before doing this, however, I would crave your indulgence for a short comparison of a few fundamental differences between French and British character and outlook. For, if we are to appreciate the problems of the French, we must not fall into the error of stating them in terms of our own past or present difficulties, but transpose the whole theme of aims and methods from the French way of thinking into our own. The British mind instinctively tends to summarise all values in terms of morality. To the French the ultimate aim is æsthetic perfection. But this includes the good and just as well as the beautiful, and enables a French writer¹ to claim for "æsthetic considerations" the value of "a lofty utility." The French approach this goal with unflinching logic along the path of perfect technique and in the light of acute criticism and merciless self-analysis. The British mind would seem to stand alone in possessing the secret of basing firm convictions upon hazy notions. Individual thinking is, with the vast majority of the French people, an inborn passion. The average Englishman seems, all too frequently, content that his opinion should conform with that of others and be unobtrusive. French logic, coupled with a never-flagging, generous interest in humanity, fills their nation with a blazing missionary spirit. It is inconceivable to them that they should not wish the whole world to share in the benefits of their discoveries. Mr. G. B. Shaw in his unexpected and moving defence of the Inquisition² has recently shown us what noble motives may underlie apparent intolerance and persecution. There is much of this spirit in the French. It is in keeping with the depth of their closely reasoned convictions, with their logic and with their generous impulses. We should try to see events in this light and not judge French actions by the somewhat dull standard of our traditional forbearance for other people's follies, which, at root, is but scepticism as to the value of our own opinions. Again, as Viscount Cecil recently told an audience of Indian students, the British look for and try practical remedies which, when, and only when, they fail, are superseded by others. The Continental idea is to work out a theory and then apply it to the problems. From these differences of first thoughts arise the divergencies which mark British and French aims and methods.

Of French individual thinking, resulting in criticism of estab-

¹ Rémy de Gourmont, *Ironies et paradoxes*.

² *Saint Joan*, and the Preface.

lished authority, we find early proof in the *Fabliaux*, in which, even in those mediæval days of faith, the Church is severely taken to task. The sixteenth century familiarised the French mind with paganism, and, within Christianity itself, brought with it the great innovation of the Reformation. Searching religious self-analysis fills the annals of the seventeenth century. The eighteenth carries destructive criticism to its climax and starts the movement which, for a long time to come, will identify "the Church" in French opinion with what is antiquated and harmful. But it was left to the French Revolution to provide the complete picture of a majority ruthlessly enforcing its views upon a minority; of a nation glibly drawing up untried theories and recklessly applying them in practice; of a people ablaze with generous zeal, bent on disseminating their discoveries for the benefit of mankind—even, where need be, by violence. From this furrowed soil of applied radicalism the roots of modern French anti-clericalism still draw nourishment.

But the anti-religious movement of the Revolution was too vehement to last. If the people were pleased to have rid the world and themselves of some of the abused privileges of the Church, the faith that had remained within them desired opportunity for peaceful worship. In this, as in other matters, it remained for Napoleon to interpret the latent desires of the silent masses. It may be said that his restoration of public worship was merely the utilitarian measure of a practical ruler. Even so, it is as much to his credit to have grasped so truly the inward feelings of the people, as to have evolved a system for co-operation between State and Church which lasted for over a hundred years.

The "Organic Articles" of 1802, the First Consul's Concordat with the Vatican and the subsequent similar provisions for the Protestant and Jewish communities, re-established the practice of public worship. They enabled the Churches to own property, to receive donations and legacies for the exercise of their ministries and the maintenance of the clergy. Episcopal palaces and vicarages were placed at their disposal. Monastic and other religious orders were allowed to return to or establish themselves in France. The education of the youth on a "confessional" or religious basis was re-introduced. At the same time the Church became a branch of the Government. Priests, pastors and rabbis were, to some extent, the paid officials of the State. The secular authorities had seats allotted to them on the various councils connected with Church administration. The bishops were nominated by "the First Consul or his successors" and con-

secrated by the Pope. The members of the Protestant Synod and the Grand Rabbi were similarly chosen by the secular authority.

This system worked to the general satisfaction of the majority of the French people for more than a hundred years. Subtle attacks upon it, however, began to be made soon after the revolution of 1848. But the spirit of what was then called "liberalism" did not succeed in bringing about any change until the eighties. In 1881 elementary education in France was made free. In 1882 it was rendered compulsory. The object was to force non-denominational education upon the masses. The ultimate aim to detach the people from the influence of the Church. At first the spirit in which these laws were interpreted was that of State neutrality towards religion. Jules Ferry in his circular to the teachers concerning these laws expressly stated it. Religion was to disappear as part of the curriculum, but parents were to be free to provide religious tuition for their children, if they so desired. They could even send them to "free schools," erected at their own expense, and conducted on a denominational basis. It was not in the nature of French character that this spirit of neutrality should last. Before many years it had changed into open hostility.

During the closing years of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth centuries the anti-religious battle blazed up in France in all its fierceness. Not only the school, but all manifestations of religion became the subject of relentless attack. In 1905, under the leadership of that narrow-minded, but energetic, partisan, M. Combes, the frankly anti-religious "Secular or Separation Laws" set the seal upon the radical victory.

All pretence of neutrality was abandoned. What remained of the Concordat was torn up and the Embassy at the Vatican abruptly withdrawn. Monastic orders and fraternities in France were dissolved and their members expelled. The same fate befell seminaries and other institutions for the preparation of religious teachers. Hereby, and with the aid of a series of stringent measures, it was hoped to make all religious tuition or education impossible, or the privilege only of a limited few, who were wealthy enough to pay for their convictions. The property of the Churches was confiscated amid scenes which distressed even a large number of unbelieving Frenchmen. The proceeds, the famous "milliard of the congregations," mysteriously dwindled away. To cripple the Church still further and prevent it from deriving voluntary financial support from its adherents, it was made illegal for it to possess more than a very inadequate sum in cash; to

receive donations or legacies, or to supply relief to the poor. The wishes of the dead were not respected: it was declared illegal to utilise past legacies for charity or masses, even though these objects had been specified by the donors. The maintenance of the Church buildings was hampered by rigid and obstructive formalities which rendered their upkeep, even at the expense of the faithful, impossible. The national as distinct from the religious prejudice caused by this part of the Comhist laws was eloquently described by the late Maurice Barrès in his moving book *The Great Tragedy of the Churches of France*. Not only religious education, not merely public worship, but the very monuments of past faith and piety were to be obliterated. The "Eldest Daughter of the Church," the State, which since the days of her "Most Christian Kings" had exercised—and to this day claims—the protection of Christians in various parts of the world, had gone as far as she could in destroying Christianity within her own borders. For the Protestant Churches fared no better than those of Rome and have, in many places, hardly been able to retain their buildings or the means of public worship.¹

The wave of militant anti-clericalism lasted unabated until about 1910. It dragged in its wake a determined policy of political oppression of all and sundry who were in the least suspected of religious feelings. To attend a mass, to send a child to a "free school," meant to any official the premature end of his career. Nor was the army free from these baneful influences. Ever since the notorious General André instituted the system of docketing the religious views of all officers, radical anti-clericalism became a better passport towards rapid promotion than military efficiency or devotion to the country.² After 1910 things eased down somewhat. There was little left to fight for on the anti-clerical side: the first round had been won. If the Catholic Church had not accepted the settlement; if she still declined to avail herself of the illusory facilities for forming local associations for the upkeep of Church buildings, so much the worse for her. The "superstition" would gradually die out by itself, now that the nation's youth had been removed from her clutches. Neverthe-

¹ See upon this matter the Protestant, Strasbourg *Kirchenbote* of August 3rd, 1924, quoting Prof. Armand Lods, of the Sorbonne, Samuel Lambert of *Le Témoignage* and Louis Lafont's article in *Évangile et Liberté*. It is a fallacy, carefully spread by the anti-clerical parties, that the Protestants of "the Interior" have approved of, even benefited by, the Separation Laws of 1905.

² It is no secret that this system was responsible for placing in prominent positions at the outbreak of the war a number of superior officers whose utter incompetence necessitated their prompt removal.

less an outburst of anti-clericalism remained the never-failing remedy for radical or socialist governments, whenever they were harassed by internal dissensions among their followers. *Manger du curé* ("to eat priest") passed into French political language as the technical term for this practice.

The war has interrupted this process. Familiarity with death and sacrifice revived the faith, latent in every soul. Intercourse on the battlefield with priests and pastors who shared the combatant posts with all Frenchmen removed many sedulously fostered prejudices. The splendid behaviour of priests and pastors and rabbis alike in the exercise of their ministries among the wounded and dying in the most advanced positions opened many eyes which had been blinded by propaganda. There arose during the war, there still exists in France, a marked religious revival, especially among the younger men. Public feeling combined with political necessity to form that "Sacred Union" of all parties in which all that counted was love of the country.

In this unbroken spirit of fellowship France fought her way to the Armistice and into the welcoming arms of the long-lost brothers in Alsace and Lorraine. It was not, as certain defenders of the present Government have claimed, from fear of their loyalty that the French Generals promised the reunited populations to respect their faith and traditions.¹ The promise which Joffre made, which Clémenceau, Poincaré, Millerand confirmed, was not the pusillanimous expression of fear. They merely gave voice to that which the whole, generous soul of France meant at that time. If she had shed so much precious blood to secure peace and freedom upon her borders, it was not in order to renew civil strife and religious oppression within. The promise to maintain the existing *status quo*, in religious as in other matters, was never intended, nor understood, to stand in the way of ultimate unification with France. We have shown how deeply it is desired by the Alsatians and Lorrainers, how loyally they are working to achieve it. The maintenance of the existing situation was merely intended to give time for assimilation by consent. Even on the religious question matters were progressing in that direction.

The revulsion of feelings during the war—and, possibly, the developments of the Near East—had caused France to renew official relations with the Vatican. An Embassy had been sent in 1917. It is still maintained. Among its quiet, unobtrusive

¹ " *Nos chefs militaires dépourvus de foi dans l'enthousiasme de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine*," are the words which M. W. Oualid does not hesitate to use in his article in " *L'Europe Nouvelle* " of July 19th.

activities were included negotiations intended to produce such modifications in the "Secular Laws" as would enable Rome to acquiesce in their application. One of the main bones of contention, the form of the local associations for the maintenance of Church buildings and their administration, was well upon its way towards a solution by agreement. In the form of diocesan associations, under the authority of the Bishop, instead of parochial and purely lay societies, a way out seemed to have been found. Difficulties there still remained, nor were they few in number. More were bound to arise when the French laws came to be applied to Alsace and Lorraine. The appointment, some little time before the present Government came into office, of the Alsatian Abbé Wetterlé to the staff of the French Embassy at the Vatican, seemed to indicate that further negotiations on this particular subject were about to take place. As a faithful Roman Catholic and loyal Alsatian who had proved his love for France in many a stubborn fight with the German authorities in pre-war days, involving even imprisonment, the presence of the Abbé in Rome was of happy augury. It justified the hope that the complete absorption of the border provinces into French unity would be achieved, gradually without friction or shock, even in that very critical matter of the relations between the State and the Churches. Complete confidence had been established throughout the three new departments in the intention of succeeding French Governments to carry out the promises given after the Armistice.

Now we reach the time of the fall of the Poincaré Government, in favour of which the majority of the Alsatian and Lorraine votes had again been cast. The first result was the struggle which ended in the removal, before the expiry of his constitutional term of office, of the Head of the State, the President himself. It so happened that M. Millerand, who had been so successful as Commissioner-General in Alsace and Lorraine, was the occupant of this high post. His treatment was not calculated to inspire the citizens in those provinces with any great confidence in the party which was about to form the Government. This Government was based upon a somewhat loose "*Bloc from the Left*" with more internal divergencies than points of agreement. They were by no means assured of the support of a majority in Parliament for the foreign policy they had in view, nor did they produce any generally attractive programme on internal matters. Were they, in this predicament, inspired by thoughts of that pre-war past when anti-clericalism was always a safe rallying-cry? Was it just the curious habit which Socialists share with exiled kings, that

they never learn and never forget? However that may be, when a deputy, representing a small minority party in Alsace-Lorraine, urged the Government to apply the Separation Laws to the border departments, the leaders jumped at the proposal. In his official declaration of policy of June 17th, M. Herriot included the "prompt and complete" application of "all French laws." (The most important and practically only controversial one still outstanding being that upon "Secularisation and Separation.") He also announced the Government's decision to withdraw the Vatican Embassy. In a speech two days later he added, in the face of the unexpected wave of opposition, that "the Government which he represented would not interfere with existing moral rights acquired by persons who had devoted themselves to the cause of France, even if they happened to be sisters belonging to an educational order." In other words, but for possible individual exceptions, the intention was to apply the laws of 1905 in full and that promptly. The Prime Minister's professed anticipation that in so doing he would be "faithfully interpreting the wishes of the dear populations which had, at last, been reunited with France," was bluntly and forcibly denied by the Alsatian deputy Schumann, speaking in the name of twenty-one out of twenty-four deputies from the three eastern departments which cover the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. The vehement, well-organised and obviously sincere protests all over the country from the whole of the Catholic population (which aggregates about 90 per cent. of the total in Lorraine and over 60 per cent. in the two provinces together) and the less passionate but equally deliberate opposition from the Protestants have fully borne out the statements of their political spokesman.

What in this respect was the position in Alsace and Lorraine until last June? As a result of the German conquest in 1870 the Concordat of 1802 ceased to have effect in respect of the two lost provinces. Cardinal Antonelli, then Foreign Secretary at the Vatican, made this clear in his letter of the 3rd January, 1872, addressed to the Bishop of Strasbourg. On the 10th February of the same year, however, it was—upon Bismarck's proposal—agreed to treat the two provinces on the basis of the provisions of the Concordat, but this was a separate Treaty between the German *Reich* and the Vatican, and not a prolongation of the Concordat. The French Government are, consequently, technically right in claiming that since the recovery by France of the three departments in November 1918, neither the Concordat nor the special Treaty with Germany has a legally binding force in Alsace and

Lorraine. The populations of these provinces admit this, but maintain that France's promise to respect the *status quo* renders it incumbent upon her to apply in practice a similar system until this is superseded *by mutual consent*.

Under the existing provisions the position of the Catholic Church is similar to that which would have resulted from the Concordat, whilst the Protestant Churches are provided for in like manner. Education is entirely upon a denominational basis; but whereas free education and obligatory school attendance were only introduced in France in 1881 and 1882 respectively, these measures have been in force in Alsace-Lorraine since 1870. On the subject of being "secularised," however, both Catholics and Protestants have expressed the strongest possible resolve to fight for the existing freedom of religious education, and to prevent the spreading in their schools of unreligious or anti-religious propaganda, such as has been sedulously fostered in many of the, ostensibly neutral, public schools in the "Interior" of France.

Perhaps this is the place to say that religious tolerance is the rule throughout both provinces. In the old Church of St. Peter, at Strasbourg, the same roof protects the Catholic masses which are celebrated in the nave and the Protestant services which are held in one of the aisles. Nor is it uncommon in the smaller country parishes to find churches being temporarily borrowed and lent for use by members of a different creed, whose own building happens to be undergoing repairs.

In the matter of monastic and other religious orders, the position of the Roman Catholics only needs to be considered. M. Herriot, himself, in the remarks quoted above, and by specific reference to the Sisters of Ribeauvillé, has acknowledged the debt which not only Alsace and Lorraine, but the whole of France, owe these devoted interpreters, nay embodiments, of the French spirit. Apparently, however, the protection extended to them is to be exceptional. It is pointed out from the Catholic side, that personal exceptions do not remove the fundamental injustice of the measures to be applied to all *Congrégations*, and that neither the Church nor the privileged individuals themselves could accept such an incomplete settlement as final. Unless room is found in France for all law-abiding religious orders there will be room for none.

Finally, there is the vexed question of Church property, its right to receive donations and legacies and to devote them to charity, Church administration and public worship. On this point the Catholics as well as the Protestants have formally and

in the most unmistakable manner asserted that they will never accept the unjust provisions of 1905, but will, if necessary, resist their application by force.

Events, it will be seen, have suddenly drifted a long way from the promising state of affairs which unobtrusive French co-operation with the Vatican was bringing about. The sudden pronouncement of the present Government is considered by the Alsatians and Lorrainers as the breaking of a clear promise. The unexpected withdrawal of the Vatican Embassy, at a moment when it seemed most necessary, they read as meaning, that not negotiation and mutual consent, but arbitrary force will be exercised to make them accept laws which offend their deepest convictions. In the face of this the Catholics, both clergy and laity, feel that nothing short of an exhibition of their real strength and determination will bring the Socialist rulers to their senses, and effect a settlement by consent. They have, therefore, adopted the attitude that they decline to accept any alteration whatsoever in the existing position, unless the whole matter is, once for all and in all its bearings, disposed of by a fresh, agreed law. They do not ask for a separate regulation in the three eastern departments; they fight for the "Interior" of France as much as for Alsace-Lorraine. For various reasons which cannot here be dealt with, the Catholic organisation in the "Interior" has never had the political cohesion which it possesses so markedly in the border provinces. Even so the Alsatians are sure of extensive support in the other parts of France for an equitable readjustment of the bitterly sectarian laws of 1905, and one which does not affect the admitted principle of the State's neutrality towards religion. At all the public processions and meetings which have been held in all parts of Alsace and Lorraine, deputies from other parts of France have taken part in the proceedings. It is a sufficient answer, if one were needed, to those who question the loyalty to France or the Republic on the part of those who are opposing the introduction of oppressive laws.

In addition to destructive criticism the Catholic as well as the Protestant Churches point to the experiences of Baden, Wurtemberg and certain Swiss Cantons, to show that even under Socialist governments the principle of "Separation" and State neutrality is not incompatible with a due consideration for religious convictions.

The Alsatian Protestants are also receiving support from their co-religionists in the "Interior." If their organisation has hitherto been less political than that of the Catholics; if they

have, naturally, a greater variety of opinions within their midst, the joint manifesto issued by the President of the Directorate of the Church of the *Confession d'Augsbourg* and the President of the Synodal Commission of the *Reformed Church*¹ has consolidated their opposition. Whilst they do not decline the principle of separation they regret that the question should have been raised in such an "unexpected and inopportune manner," and insist that the laws of 1905 must not be enforced "without fundamental alterations." They consider it a matter of paramount necessity that religious education should form part of the regular curriculum "whatever may be the exact form which the Government wished to give to the educational régime."

The Jews have not taken up any very definite position in this matter. They number, including recent immigrants from Eastern Europe, about 40,000, but live scattered in the large cities and principal market villages. Politically they have entered into the general political formations of France, usually in the Radical or Socialist parties, and do not base any action upon their common faith. Moreover, it may have been somewhat difficult for the Grand Rabbi to express a clear opinion against the Separation Laws, when practically its only supporters among the Alsatian politicians happen to belong to his persuasion. The contribution made by the Grand Rabbi to the discussion of this question has, therefore, been somewhat vague. "As far as my religion is concerned," he stated, "I foresee all sorts of difficulties which, naturally, cause me concern, as they could not be overcome without great sacrifices." He added, however, that he would loyally accept the Separation Laws if they were introduced.

What has been the attitude of the Government towards the widespread opposition which its pronouncement has aroused? It has, whenever possible, tried to mitigate the harshness of its initial statements without diminishing the satisfaction these had afforded their own partisans. During his visit to Strasbourg last September, M. Raynaldy, Minister for Commerce and Industry, assured his audience that they need have no fear: "France does not in any way desire to weaken your moral unity, neither to trouble your consciences, nor to touch you in your convictions." Having embroidered on the motto: "Wait and see," he continued thus: "At the proper time the Prime Minister will explain his intentions with the sincerity and the generous spirit which you know him to possess. He has in a supreme degree a French soul, and one cannot without injustice ascribe to him a single thought

¹ Strasbourg *Kirchenbote* of July 13th, 1924.

which would not be in consonance with the ideals of justice and liberty, for which he has always fought." As M. Herriot has always fought for Socialist ideals of justice and liberty, this assurance does not appear to have appeased those whose apprehensions are based upon religious grounds. More recently the Minister for Labour, M. Godart, added the assurance that nothing would be done in this matter without the support of Parliament. This concession may possess some practical value, and incidentally shift the burden of a decision from off the Government's shoulders. So far M. Herriot has not added anything material to his past pronouncements, but at the time of writing the daily Press reports that he has induced the Parliamentary Finance Committee to approve the withdrawal of the credit for the French Embassy at the Vatican, branding it as "useless and never having profited France."

That he will forcibly apply the Separation Laws of 1905 unaltered to the recovered provinces seems unlikely. The opposition has shown itself too real, too widespread and too well organised. Moreover, even in the "Interior" of France he would now find an unexpected measure of opposition. However, the weak position, internally, of his Government, his need of Socialist support, will not allow him to replace the clerical bogey on the shelf and content himself with merely withdrawing the Vatican Embassy. And in any event the matter cannot now remain where it is. The alarm has been raised. So long as Alsace-Lorraine had complete faith in the French promise to maintain the *status quo* until a change was made by consent, negotiations towards such an end could be carried on in an atmosphere of patience, good-will and mutual helpfulness. The "unexpected and inopportune" action of the present Government has destroyed that and the withdrawal of the Embassy will remove the machinery which could have improved matters. Delay and increased difficulty in reaching the urgently necessary settlement of this vexed question is all the Government would appear to have achieved. If it has not also produced any anti-French feeling, this is due to the inherent "Frenchness" of the Lorrainers and Alsations and to their solid common-sense, which refuses to identify any political party with the whole country to which they feel themselves to belong with their hearts and their souls.

But the populations of the recovered departments have also learned their power. They have seen that they count in the councils of France, that decisions cannot be taken over their heads. They are feeling the wings of their full citizenship. When the

younger generation, that which has had no connection with pre-war, *i.e.* German, politics, will take its place under the yellow dome on the banks of the Seine, there may be a little less display of oratorical skill, but there will be a helpful accession of constructive, practical sense to the French Parliament, as the French of the "Interior" are the first to admit. It will be brought to bear, not in the direction of securing exceptional treatment for Alsace and Lorraine, but in that of giving to France, out of the fullness of their love, the best of what their differentiated experience can add to the brilliant, humanitarian activity of the Mother-country.

JOHN DE LA VALETTE.

Note.—Since the above paper was read the French Government have introduced two bills which have accentuated the controversy between the redeemed populations and the Central Government. The first bill proposes to facilitate the admission of pupils from the government primary schools to the secondary schools and universities by privileges not extended to the "free" or denominational schools. The second transfers the existing local administration of the border provinces to the ordinary government departments in Paris. The conflict will largely be fought along the political line of cleavage between "left" and "right."

J. DE L. V.

Summary of Discussion following the above address.

MR. GLASGOW said that when he was last in Alsace he got the impression that the mass of the people did not care whether they were absorbed into France or into Germany so long as they were absorbed into one or other of them finally. It would be interesting to know what had happened in the potash industry in Alsace which had been started by the Germans before the War and had developed into a great industry.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that he had known Alsace for more than thirty-one years, and admitted that his first superficial impression of it, which he later on saw reason to modify, had been of a German country. He thought the speaker quite right in saying that the Alsatian attitude to the German annexation up to the War (and particularly after a fundamental decision taken by the Alsatians themselves) was to accentuate their own political and provincial individuality. In the early years after the annexation the Alsatians felt themselves to be French citizens and those who could emigrated to France. Then they realised that they were playing into the hands of the Prussians by draining from Alsace the leaders of the people, and that it was far more courageous to stay behind and go through the Prussian mill in school, university and barracks, even at the risk of being Prussianised. This they did—and then resisted Prussia not in the name of France or the French, but of Alsace. Yet he doubted if in their heart of hearts they regarded France as the Mother Country in the sense indicated

by the lecturer. They never forgot that they had given themselves to France voluntarily in 1790 when they adhered to the French Convention, and they never admitted the right of Germany to reverse that decision against their will.

He thought the very resistance of Alsace to Prussianisation had tended to increase Alsatian individuality; and he doubted whether they themselves realised, when they returned to France, exactly how far their own individuality had been accentuated. Nor did he think the French understood the degree to which the Alsatians had been subject to the German *empreinte*.

The lecturer had not, in his opinion, dealt quite adequately with the questions of clericalism and anti-clericalism in France. He had not mentioned the "seize mai" of 1877, nor the justification for Gambetta's cry "Le cléricalisme voilà l'ennemi." Neither had he alluded to the effect of the "reconciliation" in the early 'nineties which brought into the French army an extremely efficient and closely woven clerical organisation. That organisation was largely responsible for the Dreyfus affair—a struggle which tore France in two and raised the question whether she was to be autonomous politically and religiously, or whether she was to be merely a fief of the Vatican. After a long contest, the question was decided in favour of French religious and political autonomy by the French people.

Now the issue was different. M. Herriot had challenged the religious feelings of the Alsatian people. They would most certainly resist any attempt on the part of Paris to thrust upon them laws that had been the outcome of a very bitter French internal struggle in which Alsace had neither part nor lot.

He did not agree with Mr. Glasgow in thinking that the Alsatians cared little whether they belonged to Germany or to France. He thought they were glad to belong to France.

MR. DE LA VALETTE said that he agreed with the Chairman that the word "Mother Country" was used by us in a somewhat different sense. But he thought that when, in 1790, the Alsatians and Lorrainers showed that they wanted to be united with France, they expressed something of that feeling.

With regard to the potash mines, he knew little, but he believed a large number of German workmen, who had been specially drafted into Alsace under the German régime, had left the potash district, as they had left the steel and iron districts in Lorraine.

There admittedly existed "cliques" among the Catholics, but it was hard to say whether these gave rise to or had been provoked by anti-clerical activities. The personal element entered rather largely into any judgment upon the question of clericalism or anti-clericalism. Moreover, if the carrying through of anti-clericalism had displayed the logic of French methods, the inception of the movement had not been free from influences which were in no way French.

REVIEWS.

Western Civilisation and the Far East. By STEPHEN KING-HALL. 1924. (London: Methuen. 9 × 68. xxv + 385 pp. 18s.)

At last a reliable, competent and unprejudiced text-book of recent Far Eastern history has made its appearance—full of facts, figures, quotations and instances, carefully chosen and documented, compactly and intelligently arranged. It is written in a vivid and pleasing style, full of arresting and sometimes humorous phrases. It has coherence and continuity derived from a single underlying train of thought, which is indicated in the title.

Western civilisation has invaded the Orient; and its influence is beginning to be permanent, progressive (towards what end we cannot yet foresee) and in many ways unwelcome to us. A Renaissance period has commenced in Asia. Its potentialities are all the more serious owing to what Commander King-Hall has indicated to us in four maps entitled, "The Shrinkage of the World due to Improved Communications." This sudden shortening of distances coincides with the demand of Japan (and to some extent of China also) for complete equality with the "white" peoples. A warning of what was in store for us was sounded by Professor C. H. Pearson in his book, *National Life and Character*, first published in 1893; and we who have to study Far Eastern problems retain that book on our nearer shelves like a kind of *memento mori*. It deals with the readjustment of the balance between the white and the coloured races. This is the great problem which British statesmanship has to solve. Other lesser problems may require more urgent attention. But this is the vital question which closes the vista of our political prescience—the "To be or not to be" of our empire and of our civilisation.

Commander King-Hall is well aware of the problem and its implications, but he is not so gloomy as Professor Pearson. "I admit I am an optimist," he writes, "and the distressing condition of the world to-day convinces me that the only remedy lies in an idealism which strains the limits of practicability to their utmost."

He traces the disintegration of China from the Japanese War in 1894; and he traces what he most happily calls "the synthetic manufacture of a Great Power called Japan." While admitting the deplorable state of China and pointing out its causes, he insists that the picture painted in the Press is much too dark. Nor does he regard China as a danger to us, unless the conservatism of the Powers brings "the worst form of militaristic nationalism into the hearts of the Chinese. . . . The Chinese are not, at present, strongly anti-Western in sentiment, and, if treated fairly, are not likely to become so."

Our author, writing as it seems from the political Left—the Labour Party to him is "the child of the dawn"—is more at ease in China than in Japan, where short shrift is given to such purveyors

of "dangerous thoughts." He frankly sympathises with Young China's aspirations. But Japan—artificial, bureaucratic, reactionary and militarist—fills him with dismay and alarm. "A people volatile in character, politically unconscious, nurtured on fallacious traditions." What is their future? Is it explosion outwards, or collapse inwards? "The Bolshevisation of Japan," he says—and he writes from recent and intelligent observation of the country—"is not such a fantastic idea."

There are four classes of person who write about the Far East—the Expert, the Earnest Student, the Propagandist and the Ignoramus. I have arranged them in order of merit; but as regards productivity, the order should be reversed. Commander King-Hall belongs to the second category; and, as such he is more helpful than the Expert, who is afraid to risk his reputation. The Expert might say: "Yes, this is quite good; but Orientals are incalculable people. There are fundamental factors of fatalism and impersonality which we cannot fully understand. They bear what seems to us unbearable; they resent what seems immaterial. Their nature is like those nests of Indian boxes. You open one, only to find yet another inside—similar but different. Take your interesting chapter on Shinto. It is true so far as it goes, but you omit to specify the obvious connection between Shinto and ancestor-worship—an important omission. *Ryobu Shinto* (the Shinto-Buddhist blend) was not an invention of the nineteenth century, but dates from before 1000 A.D. You write about the divinity of the Emperor, and you point to the contrast between 'godhead' and 'plus-fours' in the case of the Prince Regent. But 'divinity' and 'godhead' do not mean quite the same thing to the Japanese as they do to us. The vision of a God on the putting-green might merely reassure them that Deity is up-to-date. Their inconsequence is different from our inconsequences; and our logic does not always fit their processes. So, beware!"

The author is to be congratulated on an original and valuable piece of work. This is quite the most important book on Far Eastern affairs which has been published since the War. It contains appendices, a useful bibliography, an index and some maps. The railway map of China is not altogether reliable. It assigns far too much territory to the Japanese leasehold of Kwantung, and the railways themselves are not quite as they should be.

The Caliphate. By SIR THOMAS W. ARNOLD. 1924. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 223 pp. 10s. 6d.)

PERUSAL of this exhaustive treatise by the first British authority on the subject leaves the impression that, while it is fairly easy to say what the Caliphate *de facto* is not, it is extraordinarily difficult to say what it is, and still more difficult to say what *de jure* it ought to be. It is not, and never has been, a Papacy, despite mediæval statements about the later Abbasids or modern efforts—some of these made even by Moslems—to assimilate the Caliph's position to that of the supreme Roman Pontiff. It is not, and never has been, any sort of priesthood—an institution, in any sense understood in the West, non-existent in Islam. Caliphs have had nothing to

do with determination of doctrine, interpretation of religious law, control of conscience, remission of sin, or intercessory mediation between man and God. But when Sir Thomas Arnold crystallises his particular negatives into the universal axiom that the Caliphate has never exercised or been credited with any "spiritual" function, one must pause; for was not the function which Caliphs, notably the later Abbasids both at Baghdad and Cairo, did certainly exercise, in virtue of some sort of "apostolic succession" (itself a "spiritual" concept) of investing chosen holders of temporal power, a "spiritual" function based on a mystic idea? And is it not just such a "spiritual" virtue, popularly credited (whatever jurists might say), that not only sustained the Caliphate throughout the Middle Ages, but has revived its influence with the Sunni masses in recent times and still keeps desire of it alive in spite of Angora?

It may indeed be said that unless some popular spiritual conception of the "apostolic succession" order, however vaguely defined—some generally accepted idea of continuous communication of divine purpose through ordained personages, who have inherited from the Last of the Prophets—be allowed in Sunni Islam, it is impossible to find any single qualification common to holders of the Caliphate throughout its long history. Every other possible qualification—tribal, or family birth, temporal control of the world, or of all the Islamic world, or of its Holy Places, or indeed of any part soever of it or any individual in it—has failed Caliphs again and again, and yet they have been recognised Caliphs. Sir Thomas Arnold's own masterly exposition of their history proves this to the hilt. Strive as he may, by exclusion of all spiritual idea, to arrive at a juridical definition, he ends with none more consistent with the actual facts of the past and the present than was attained by those Moslem jurists, whose failures he rightly exposes.

The later chapters of this masterly treatise—those dealing with the Ottoman Caliphate—will excite most general interest. They are full of facts little known and salutary correctives of popular beliefs. Sir Thomas Arnold has made his own the obscure question of the passing of the office from the *fainéant* Abbasids to the Turkish Sultans; and states a strong case against the received story that a formal transfer was made by Mutawakkil, the last of the Abbasids, to Salim the Grim. The most striking fact, not usually reckoned with, is that Mutawakkil, after his return to Cairo, did actually exercise, when Salim was dead, the Caliphial function of investing a (rebel) holder of temporal power. But, as Sir Thomas recognises, this fact together with the absence of any authority earlier than Mouradgèa d'Ohsson at the close of the eighteenth century, does not amount to proof and leaves the salient consideration in the case, the retention of the Caliphial insignia in Stamboul, unexplained. It is likely enough, of course, that Salim both seized and kept those insignia by the divine right of might; but also it is possible that Mouradgèa d'Ohsson knew something that we do not. The interest of the question is in any case mainly academic; for it is quite certain that the Ottoman Caliphate when, after some two centuries of comparative obscurity, it came to be insisted upon, was recognised by the vast majority of Moslems, as well as by Christian Powers, because of the actual temporal position of the Sultans in the world of Islam, and not in virtue of any Abbasid cession, if one there ever had been.

D. G. HOGARTH.

A Short History of International Intercourse. By C. DELISLE BURNS. 1924. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 8vo. 159 pp. 3s. 6d.)

THE idea on which this little book is based is an admirable one. To trace the development of communications between the nations, to show the influence they exerted on one another and to estimate their contributions to science and art is a project worthy of the greatest praise. Mr. Delisle Burns endeavours to accomplish this task in less than 150 pages. He begins with the year 1000 A.D., allowing himself a few musings about the Roman Empire, but hardly mentioning Greek philosophy or art. A chapter each is given to the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Age, the Age before the Great War. He finishes with a description of the world after the War and a chapter on the future.

So rapid a survey of so large a field will certainly stimulate the imagination of those who have never thought along these lines even if it can hardly give them a very comprehensive account of how things happened. A number of interesting facts are mentioned which are often omitted from history textbooks. There are also a good many judgments and opinions, some of which are of a rather questionable nature. Some of the statements of fact may also be criticised as too strongly expressed. Is it true, for example, that immediately before the Great War "twenty out of every hundred inhabitants in the organised cities of the world were starving to death"? This is, however, an extreme instance, and the book as a whole is stimulating and original. It conveys, however, an impression that it was hastily written, and it may be hoped that the author will develop his excellent idea on a larger scale and with more deliberation.

C. K. WEBSTER.

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

The Occident and the Orient. By Sir VALENTINE CHIROL. 1924. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8vo. xi + 228 pp. \$2.)

Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922. By HENRY WICKHAM STEED. 2 vols. 1924. (London: Heinemann. 9 + 6. xiv + 412 pp., 418 pp. 32s. net.)

The Stabilisation of Europe. By CHARLES DE VISSCHER. 1924. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8vo. xi + 190 pp. \$2.)

Germany in Transition. By HERBERT KRAUS. 1924. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8vo. xi + 236 pp. \$2.)

A Treatise on International Law. By WILLIAM EDWARD HALL. 8th ed. by A. PEARCE-HIGGINS. 1924. (Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xlvii + 952 pp.)

Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism. By C. A. BODELSEN. 1924. (London: Gylendendal. 8vo. 226 pp.)

The Constitution of the United States: Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow. By JAMES M. BECK. 1924. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 354 pp. 12s. 6d.)

MEETINGS.

ON November 25th, Mr. E. R. Peacock gave an address on "Some Aspects of the Mexican Problem." The Right Hon. Lord Eustace Percy was in the chair. A summarised report of the proceedings follows:

MR. PEACOCK said that he thought that it would be best to deal with this difficult question by way of narrative. What was the Mexican problem? (1) From the point of view of the City, the problem was how to increase the trade between Mexico and Great Britain, and how best to preserve the properties in Mexico in which British money was invested, and ensure that some return was again received for the money. There was a large British investment in Mexico which ten or twelve years ago was yielding a return of perhaps £10,000,000 a year to this country. Since the year after General Diaz ceased to be President it had given practically nothing. (2) There was a larger problem also. What part was the Mexican nation to play in the world? Was it to be a burden on humanity or was it to contribute its fair share towards humanity?

Mr. Peacock then gave an extremely interesting and instructive sketch of the historical background and the economic value of the Mexico of to-day.

With regard to diplomatic relations, after General Diaz was turned out, the United States continued to have a Chargé d'Affaires there. Great Britain, however, did not give her representative an official standing but appointed him Keeper of the Archives, which placed him in an extraordinarily difficult position. On the one hand he was expected by his Government to protest to the Mexican Government if they acted contrary to our interest, and on the other hand he had to assure them, whenever they wanted to use him, that he had no official standing. It happened that Mr. Cummins, who was placed in that position, knew General Obregon very well before he became President, and as the personal side meant everything in Mexico, this was of the greatest possible assistance to him in overcoming the difficulties of his position. But there was bound to be constant trouble. He thought that before the General Election in 1923, the Government had decided that they must see whether some kind of agreement could not be reached. When the new Government came in they finally decided to send out someone to deal with the matter and appointed Mr. Hohler.

Two years ago the United States Government had sent two representatives to Mexico with the understanding that if an agreement on claims against the Mexican Government could be reached recognition would follow. They came to an agreement and immediately afterwards came recognition. Their representative had been there, had established good personal relations with the Mexicans and helped his nationals in their troubles, which was what we wanted. The obvious time for us to send out someone was then, but it was not done.

In the meantime, in the short interval which elapsed before Mr. Hohler's arrival in Mexico, relations with Mr. Cummins became acute, and he was ordered to leave at once. The Mexicans had been longing to have a British representative, and yet with that queer unaccountability which is so essentially theirs they dashed the whole thing to the ground.

Then came the Evans murder. The British Government, he thought, would like to find a way out. The Mexican Government he was quite sure would like to. But it was difficult, and the difficulty had been increased by the recent visit of General Calles to Europe. It had been hoped he would come to this country. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald asked him to come here and said he would like to receive him, but General Calles said that, before he could do so, we must give Mexico unconditional recognition. He had a perfect right to come to that decision, but what made it more difficult was that General Calles, having been received with great pomp by Germany, France and the United States, was suffering from a swelled head. Until the Mexican mentality was understood it seemed inexplicable; when they wanted something very much they did not go straight for it, but invariably took a circuitous route. The Treaty of Friendship with Great Britain was signed in 1826, and from that time to this the Mexicans have liked us.

What of the Mexico of the future? The Mexican nation was a less mixed nation than almost any other. There were two elements in it—Spaniard and Indian. The population of Mexico to-day was about 15,000,000 people. Of that number about 8,000,000 were *mestizos*. Not more than about 500,000 or 600,000 were creoles. The balance were Indians. It was true that the Indians represented a great many tribes—fifty languages perhaps were spoken among them—but it was also true that they nearly all harked back to the earlier peoples of whom he had spoken. The Aztecs conquered the Indians but did not drive them out, and were finally absorbed by the Indians. So it had always been. The Spaniards conquered them and went away, but the Indians stayed. Now as a result of three hundred years of Spanish residence in Mexico there were 8,000,000 of mixed stock.

The question was who was going to rule Mexico. Since Diaz it had been the *mestizo* with Indian support. He did not think the *mestizo* was a man who would rule a great country. The *mestizo* was not physically equal either to the Indian or the Spaniard. Mentally there was a sort of turmoil going on in his blood. He was subject to a delusion of greatness. He was excitable and quick-witted. The pure whites never reached more than one million two or three hundred thousand people. There were not more than 600,000 there to-day. Could they return and lead their country forwards, or was the Indian gradually going to reassert himself and was Mexico going to go backwards? He felt certain the Indian was gradually going to re-assert himself. Of 8,000,000 *mestizos*, more than half were the dark *mestizos*, and these were the powerful *mestizos*. If the Indians returned, would the Americans be able to stand it indefinitely? The Mexicans themselves feared and disliked the Americans, because they always remembered that that great country lay for a thousand miles along their border and took from them by force a considerable part of their territory once before. They believed that the Americans would like to take it all. He believed that they were quite wrong. The preferable solution would be the return of the creole.

MR. YORKE introduced himself by saying that he had been a Director of the Mexican Railway Company for twenty-five years and Chairman for sixteen years.

Before the War his Company was earning half a million sterling, or £10,000 a week. The loss of that income had been a very serious matter. They had, however, not done so badly, and had got their property back in 1920 within three weeks of the revolution being over.

In spite of the revolution and the money they had had to put back into the line, they had received in 1921 £300,000; in 1922 £315,000, and in 1923 £250,000. This year things being worse they had only received £175,000. He thought that was a great deal of money to have got from the country in the circumstances. Under the law of Mexico his property might be taken any day by the Government. The law provided a compensation, but it might be years before the Company got it. Out of every £1 that came into this country before the War, 1s. came from Mexico. We ought to make good our investments there, and his own view was that we were far more likely to do so by recognising the Mexican Government than by withholding recognition as at present. What were our reasons for not recognising Mexico? Most people said the chief reason was because she did not pay her debts. Well, Mexico had actually paid 15,000,000 gold dollars to the International Committee of Bankers since 1920. She had pinched and pinched to do it. Mexico again was supposed to be a non-civilised country. He could mention several things which pointed to Mexico being more civilised than we were.

She had a much higher standard of manners, and in many ways of education. With regard to political conditions, people probably did not know that Mexico to-day was much nearer to a democratic Government than she was in 1913. They had improved enormously the living conditions of the people. Pensions were given under the law, and the railway employee after twenty-five years' service received after retirement until his death the full rate of pay of his last year of service. Even after a man had retired his employer had to bury him. People said it was a Bolshevik country. He believed Bolshevism was absolutely alien to the Latin-American nature. The Mexicans to his mind had built upon our own labour laws and those of the United States, but they had built too logically and with too much imagination. He would like to know what was in the minds of the Foreign Office at present with regard to Mexico. If we had backed the strongest party for the time being in Mexico things would have been better there than they were to-day. The cases which had been put before the Foreign Office—including that of Mrs. Evans—were to his mind all bad cases. Obregon had said (about recognition) that when a complaint became chronic it became tolerable, and he did not believe that any move would be made by the Mexican Government. He wished the Foreign Office could find some bridge to bring the two countries together. He was very much concerned about his own company and other Mexican investments. It seemed to him a thousand pities that in this country, where the British were so much more sympathetic to the native than the American, we should be put at a disadvantage by having no official representation. *Tout comprendre est tout pardonner*, was the view he would urge.

MR. WYNDHAM BEWES said that he thought the general impression in England was that the reason why we did not recognise the recent Government in Mexico was because our Foreign Office had got into the habit of "licking the Yankee boots." If we had followed our own course without consulting others, he believed we should have recognised them long ago. He would also like to ask in connection with the white population in Mexico, was it not a fact that the Roman Catholic Church was not altogether popular there and that that Church was the chief supporter of the white people? Lastly, what was the position of the Japanese in Mexico? Were they not going there in great numbers, and were they not likely to become very powerful there before long?

MR. A. L. KENNEDY said that Señor Nieto arrived in London, in order to negotiate recognition, just at the time of the change of Governments. One of the first things that happened when the Labour Government got in was that they recognised Russia right away, and Nieto thought it very hard that Russia should be recognised and that Mexico should have to argue about it. After some very unsatisfactory meetings another Mexican gentleman turned up (named Muzquiz) and said he had something to do with arranging recognition with this country. Nieto was asked to produce his authority from Obregon but failed to do so, and the Foreign Office rather naturally came to the conclusion that it was not a satisfactory moment for negotiating recognition. Nieto then got influenza and returned to his post in Sweden (he being Mexican Minister in Stockholm). Then, as they had heard, Mrs. Evans was killed and our representative sent out of the country, and that stopped Mr. Thomas Hohler being sent out to report on the situation in Mexico.

MR. CHARLES WRIGHT asked how much security of property existed in Mexico under the law? In the first place, what did the law permit, and in the second, what prospect was there of getting compensation?

In conclusion Mr. Peacock said that, speaking from practical experience in Mexico, he thought that when one understood the country and its people, the amount of injustice was not so great as was generally supposed. There were cases of rather flagrant injustice. All those of which he had knowledge arose through the action or inaction of State Governors rather than of the Federal Government. So far as he knew the Obregon Government had been reasonably satisfactory in that respect, but there was a greater conflict between the States in Mexico than even in the United States. Regarding the point about our subservience to the United States, he thought that the British Government and the British nation had long shown a lack of understanding of the American character which led them to be more conciliatory than was necessary or wise. He thought that where the Foreign Office lost its chance was in not acting after the United States accorded recognition of Mexico two years ago. He thought that the Foreign Office was really anxious to come to an arrangement now if one could be found, and he hoped one could be found.

With regard to the Roman Catholic Church, it had a great hold on the Indian people, and it was true that nearly all the whites were Roman Catholics, but he did not feel he was in a position to say any more about it. As to the Japanese, to a certain extent the position was rather similar to that on the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada. They were not keen to have them in and were making a great effort to bring in a large number of Germans and Poles to fill up that coast. He agreed with Mr. Yorke about the manners of the Mexicans. He also agreed that Bolshevism was not suitable to the Mexican character, but there had been a tendency towards extremism in labour in recent years, which had been encouraged by General Calles. That, however, had not been entirely peculiar to Mexico.

On December 2nd, Mr. John de la Valette read a paper on "The Absorption of Alsace and Lorraine." Mr. H. Wickham Steed was in the chair. The paper and the discussion following will be found on p. 30.

On December 9th, Mr. Algernon Cecil read a paper on "The Diplomacy of the Vatican in the Twentieth Century." The Right Hon. Lord Fitzalan of Derwent was in the chair. The paper will be found on page 1. Lack of space unfortunately precludes the printing of a record of the discussion following the address, in which Mr. Hilaire Belloc, Mr. G. G. Coulton, Mr. H. Wickham Steed, Mr. Herbert Ward and Mr. E. L. Woodward took part.

On December 16th, Mr. R. Fitzgibbon Young gave an address on "Czechoslovakia." The Right Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare was in the chair. The following joined in the discussion after the address: Mr. Harold Spender, Mrs. F. T. Swanwick, Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge, Mrs. Beauchamp Tufnell and Mr. Raymond Unwin.

Conversations.

The following conversations have been held at Chatham House :

December 1st, 1924	Subject : India.
" 15th "	Subject : African Problems, with special relation to questions of health and population.
" 18th "	Subject : Opium.
January 19th, 1925	Subject : Bulgaria
" 19th "	Subject : China.

Library.

It is hoped that members who have not already done so will take an early opportunity of inspecting the Library at Chatham House. The furnishing and fittings are now complete and the Library and Finance Sub-Committees are tackling the problem of providing the books and documents to fill the shelves. Towards this object cheques for £100 each have been received from Mrs. Buck of the Noverings, Bosbury, near Ledbury, and from Mr. Herbert Baker, F.R.I.B.A., of 2, Smith Square. The Library Sub-Committee is preparing a list of the books upon which this £200 are to be expended. Resolutions expressing the cordial thanks of the Executive Committee have been sent by Sir Maurice de Bunsen to each of these generous donors.

The Sub-Committee wishes to take this opportunity of recording, on behalf of the Institute, its thanks to Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, who has most kindly undertaken to organise a map department for the Institute and has also presented a large number of maps as a nucleus.

The thanks of the Sub-Committee are also due to the following for gifts to the Library: Mr. Lionel Curtis, Mr. Alex. Devine, Mr. E. A. Filene, Mrs. Edmund Garrett, Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, Sir Cecil Hurst, Mr. Sinclair Kennedy, Mr. J. M. Keynes, Lieut.-Commander Stephen King-Hall, Sir Frederick Lugard, Dr. R. P. Scott, Dr. Harold Spender, Mr. Stanley Unwin, Mr. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, jun., Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, the Argentine

Legation, the Belgian Embassy, the Bolivian Consulate-General, the Czechoslovak Legation, the Netherlands Legation, the Polish Legation, the Swedish Legation, the Uruguayan Legation.

Royal Colonial Institute

The Library Committee of the Royal Colonial Institute has generously offered the use of its Library to members of the B.I.I.A. Those members wishing to avail themselves of this privilege are requested to obtain, from the Secretary of the B.I.I.A., a letter of introduction to the Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute.

Report on Foreign Affairs

Members who have not as yet received this valuable Report, produced by the Empire Parliamentary Association and issued as a supplement to the Journal of the Institute, are reminded that if they wish to do so they should apply to the Secretary of the Institute, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, S.W. 1. As has been explained, the Report can only be issued to members who undertake to treat it as confidential, and a form to be signed for this purpose will be sent immediately upon application to the Secretary.

Journal—May, 1924

The supply of the Journal for May 1924 is nearly exhausted, and any members who do not wish to keep a complete file of the Journal are asked if they would be so good as to return their copies of that issue to the Secretary of the Institute at 10 St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

FORTHCOMING MEETINGS

in the Library of the Institute, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, S.W. 1., at 8.15 p.m.

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| Tuesday, Feb. 3rd. | Extraordinary General Meeting to consider Draft Charter and Bye-Laws. Chairman: Viscount CECIL of CHELWOOD. |
| „ Feb. 10th. | “The Mind of China.” Speaker: Mr. ARCHIBALD ROSE. Chairman: Sir JOHN JORDAN, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.B. |
| „ Feb. 24th. | “The Political Structure of Soviet Russia.” Speaker: Baron A. MEYENDORFF. Chairman: Professor Sir PAUL VINOGRADOFF. |
| „ March 10th. | “British Foreign Policy in Asia and its Relation to India.” Speaker: Sir GEORGE LLOYD, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., D.S.O., M.P. Chairman: The Lord MESTON, K.C.S.I. |
| „ March 24th. | “The Problem of the Rhineland.” Speakers: Brig.-General E. L. SPEARS, C.B., C.B.E., Brig.-General J. H. MORGAN, C.B. Chairman: General Sir ALEXANDER GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. |

THE LIBRARY

A REMINDER OF ITS NEEDS

Extract from letter circulated to members, December 10, 1921:

“ It is hoped that members of the Institute will assist in the formation of the Library, and I am, therefore, on behalf of the Executive Committee, to ask you whether you would be able to contribute gifts of books (especially modern standard books on international relations and foreign countries) or periodicals or modern maps and atlases. If so, would you be kind enough to address to the Secretary a list of any works which you are able to offer.”

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